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The String of Pearls is a term that has permeated Indian naval policy circles in recent 
years. This term encapsulates the idea that, since the early 1990s, China has been 
developing a network of naval bases in south Asian littoral nations as a means to project 
maritime power into the Indian Ocean and beyond to the Middle East. Contrary to Indian 
perceptions, Chinese activity in the littoral nations has, to this point, been primarily 
economic, not military in nature. Nonetheless, this activity has prompted a change in 
Indian naval doctrine to support the employment of a blue water navy. This change in 
Indian naval doctrine can be explained utilizing Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory 
describes the effects of a psychophysical tendency that prompts people to become risk 
acceptant in the face of losses. This study will show how the Indian National Security 
Elite, when faced with the perceived loss of power and influence to China in south Asian 
waters, endorsed blue water naval doctrine as a means to reestablish the status quo of 
relative naval superiority in the northern Indian Ocean. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 1405, Admiral Zheng He departed the Chinese coast at the head of a 62 ship 
armada on his way to overawe the coastal nations Asia with the might of the Ming 
Empire.1  The journey was designed to not only corral more nations into the tributary 
embrace of the Chinese Emperor but also to conduct trade. The armada was made up of 
approximately 28,000 men and a wide array of wooden ships, some of which were the 
largest in the known world.2  The audacious display of Chinese maritime power was 
followed by centuries of isolation when the Emperor decided in 1433 to relinquish Asian 
maritime dominance in order to focus on maintenance of the status quo on the continent.3  
It would not be until 1985 when Chinese vessels once again cut through the Indian 
Ocean. The impact of Zheng He’s voyage is still being felt within the Indian security 
establishment. This idea that Chinese naval power will again plow through Asian waters 
on its way to subjugating south Asian littoral nations is a meme that resonates within 
Indian security circles.4  The most recent manifestation of Indian concern about growing 
Chinese naval capability is fixation on the idea that China is building a series of naval 
bases in south Asia. This narrative reads that since the early 1990s, the Chinese have 
been seeking to persuade Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Pakistan to 
grant the rights to use existing ports for military purposes or to allow it to construct naval 
bases in order to project power into the Middle East and Africa and to secure Chinese 
strategic lines of communication. This plan has become popularly known as China’s 
“String of Pearls” strategy (Figure 1).  
                                                 
1 Emrys Chew, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and the Maritime Balance of 
Power in Historical Perspective” (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), 4–5. 
2 Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the 
Asian Littoral” (Sydney: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 1–2. 
3 Chew, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and the Maritime Balance of Power in 
Historical Perspective,” 5. 
4 Anticipation of China’s eventual reemergence as a naval power has been detectable in writings by 
Indian naval strategists and policymakers since the 1970s. After China’s first naval foray into the Indian 
Ocean in over 400 years in 1985, speculation of Chinese intent in the Indian Ocean has been an integral 
part of Indian maritime security calculations. 
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Figure 1.  String of Pearls5 
The term String of Pearls was first used in a report prepared by the Booz 
Hamilton consulting firm for the Defense Department titled Energy Futures in Asia. The 
phrase encapsulated an idea that was held the Indian National Security Elite (INSE) for 
almost a decade prior to the publication of the Energy Futures report. It is the notion that 
Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean in the form of naval activity to include operations, 
port calls and basing is eroding Indian influence in the region. This Chinese presence has 
sparked a major change to Indian naval strategy. Coinciding with this increased Chinese 
presence the Indian Ocean is was a shift in Indian naval doctrine from one that focused 
on maintaining regional naval superiority (green water) to one that envisions the Indian 
navy having the capability to operate globally and plug into international coalitions (blue 
water).   
On the surface, there does not appear to be anything strange about a nation 
updating its naval doctrine in response to a maritime challenge posed by another naval 
power. A change in the strategic environment would prompt policymakers to reconsider 
current approaches. A change in military doctrine is a pivotal step because, among other 
things, military doctrine informs budgetary, personnel and procurement decisions. In the 
case of a navy, doctrine can drive what types of ships, weapons systems and aircraft are 
                                                 
5Map graphics derived from: “Geography Maps,” About.com, http://geography.about.com/. 
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purchased, how personnel are trained and where forces are based. Most importantly, 
doctrine is a major factor in the operational effectiveness of a military force. Doctrine 
determines how a force will be employed and what kind of effects it expects to achieve in 
the field or on the sea. Given the powerful impact that doctrine has on a military force, a 
change in doctrine is a significant step that is not taken lightly by a nation’s security 
establishment. Studies have shown that military organizations resist changing doctrine 
under many circumstances. Given the importance of military doctrine, what was it about 
increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean that caused the Indians to abandon a 
proven naval doctrine that secured their national interests for more than four decades? 
In this case, the change in naval strategy is best described using Prospect Theory; 
Prospect Theory describes a psychophysical6 propensity that people hold that creates 
incentives to take risks in response to losses. It was the idea that the India was losing 
influence to China in its near abroad that allowed for a sea change in thinking and for a 
naval doctrine to emerge that was not feasible in a previous era.   
A. INDIAN NAVAL DOCTRINE 
Before we proceed, an aside must be taken to clarify terminology. According to 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms doctrine 
is defined as:” Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 
guide their actions in support of national objectives.”7  The term ‘blue water navy’ refers 
to force which can operate on the open seas on a sustained basis and has the logistics 
capability required to conduct replenishment operations at sea. Blue water navies have 
the capability to project power onto land and to conduct surface, air and subsurface 
operations around the world. The aircraft carrier battle group is most often associated 
with blue water navies, however other platforms such as amphibious ships, helicopter 
carriers, guided missile destroyers, nuclear submarines, supply ships and refuelers are 
also essential to rounding out the modern blue water capability set. Blue water navies can 
                                                 
6 The term psychophysical refers to the link between physical stimulus and psychological changes. 
Rose McDermott, Risk Taking in International Politics Propect Theory in American Foreign Policy  (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 18.  
7 “DoD Dictionary of Military Terms,”  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 
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deliver a significant amount of combat power onto land in the form of ordnance delivered 
by carrier launched aircraft or through the landing of amphibious forces on foreign 
shores. At the other end of the spectrum, a brown water navy is primarily a riverine force 
capable of patrolling and defending navigable inland waters and estuaries. The historical 
use of the term brown water navy was also used to describe a force that defends coastal 
waters, harbors and ports.8  A green water navy operates in waters in between those that 
of a blue and brown water navy.   A green water navy can operate close to shore at 200 
nm or less however it can also reach further for a limited duration.9  Logistics is one of 
the main limiting factors to green water naval operations; since green water navies have a 
limited capability to conduct replenishment while underway they are tethered to home 
ports. Green water navies may possess limited power projection capabilities usually in 
the form of missiles, special operations forces and aircraft. Green water navy mission sets 
may include securing SLOCs within a few hundred kilometers of the coast or performing 
various functions in regional waters. Green water navies can dispatch single or a handful 
of ships to conduct operations on a limited basis far afield, usually in conjunction with 
coalition partners.   
From independence in 1949 to 1998 the Indian navy operated primarily as a green 
water navy. After a short period of brown water operation in the 1950s the Indian navy 
quickly transitioned into a green water role. This transition occurred relatively quickly 
and by the late 1960s the Indian navy had the capability to establish regional maritime 
superiority over its primary rival, Pakistan. As I will show in a subsequent chapter, Indian 
naval policymakers never had the desire to limit the navy to a brown water role; from the 
beginning the Indian navy envisioned a larger role and settled into a green navy maritime 
doctrine. The primary purpose of India’s green water navy was to secure an area of the 
Indian Ocean that has historically been vital politically and economically. 
                                                 
8 Current U.S. Navy publications limits use of the term ‘brown water navy ‘to  only describe forces 
that operate on inland waters such as rivers and estuaries.  “Naval Operations Concept 2010 Implementing 
The Maritime Strategy”  (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010).  
9 Green water navies can conduct goodwill operations further afield, sending ships on port calls at 
ports outside the region, however they have a limited ability to conduct sustained, multi-ship operations far 
(greater than 1000 nm) from home port. 
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B. INDIA’S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
Despite Indian rhetoric regarding the importance of the entire Indian Ocean 
region, historically and economically, Indian concern primarily revolves around the status 
of the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea and the part of the northern 
Indian Ocean that is approximately 500 km south of India that encompass major east-
west Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). For future reference, this region will be 
referred to as the Northern Indian Ocean Area (NIOA) (Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2.  North Indian Ocean Area10 
Extra regional power presence in NOIA is disconcerting to the Indians for a 
variety of reasons. The waters of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal house both 
Indian territory and key economic resources. There are 723 islands off of the east coast of 
India, including the strategic Andaman and Nicobar chain.11  An additional 474 islands 
lie off of the west coast, including the Lakshadweep chain in the southwest.12  In addition 
                                                 
10 “Geography Maps,” About.com, http://geography.about.com/. 
11 Indian Maritime Doctrine   (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, 2009), 62. 
12 Ibid. 
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to islands, India’s Exclusive Economic Zone extends for 200 kilometers from its coasts 
(Figure 3). Oil deposits and fisheries lie underneath the waters of India’s EEZ. Indian 
fisheries produce 3.93 million tons of fish annually.13  India’s major oil deposits sit 
underneath waters off of the coast near Mumbai. India has more than 5.7 billion  barrels 
of proven oil reserves, most of which reside offshore in the Indian EEZ.14  
 
Figure 3.  Indian Exclusive Economic Zone15 
The SLOCs that phase through the NIOA are extremely important to India (Figure 
4). The volume of shipping that passes through the NOIA is massive and has increased 
dramatically since 1970. More than 100,000 ships pass through the NOIA Malacca 
annually (Figure 5).16  Shipping lanes in the NOIA feed the 12 major Indian ports and 
trading along the Indian coast is facilitated by more than 187 minor ports.17  The Indian 
economy has historically relied heavily on imports and this situation is greater today due 
                                                 
13 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Manual on Fishery Statistics,” (New Delhi: 
Central Statistics Office, Government of India, 2011), 2. 
14 Energy Information Association, “Country Analysis Briefs India,” (Washington, DC: Department of 
Energy, 2011), 2–4. 
15 “Indian Exclusive Economic Zone,” National Institute of Oceanography Bioinformatics Center, 
http://niobioinformatics.in/ 
16 Indian Maritime Doctrine, 57.  
17 Ibid., 63. 
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to rapid economic growth. From 1986 to 2006 the Indian trade balance skyrocketed 
2900%.18   India imports 75% of its oil and 16% of the gas it consumes.19   
 
Figure 4.  Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication20 
 
Figure 5.  Sea Lines of Communications through Strait of Malacca21 
                                                 
18 Anne O. Krueger, “The Role of Trade and International Economic Policy in Indian Trade 
Performance,” Asian Economic Policy Review 3 (2008): 273. 
19 Arvind Maharajan, “Overseas Acquisitions of Energy Assets by India,” (Institute of Management, 
Chennai, 2010), 2. 
20 “Indian Ocean Shipping Lanes,” Science Photo Library, http://www.sciencephoto.com/. 
21  “Indian Ocean Shipping Lanes,” Shiplink, http://www.shiplink.lk/. 
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The littoral nations of the NIOA have historic, cultural and security relationships 
with India. With the exception of Thailand, all of the NIOA littoral nations were once 
part of the British Raj. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma were all governed by the 
British as a unified territory. Pakistan is India’s main regional rival. Myanmar has 
worried Indians due to its close relationship with China. It will be shown in subsequent 
chapters that the uncontested control of the NIOA by the British Empire shaped how 
Indian policymakers viewed India’s responsibilities in the area. The southern and western 
Indian Ocean has not historically factored into Indian strategic calculations. While the 
Antarctic has important scientific value and the Indians have maintained a research 
station there since 1982, this area and the thousands of miles of ocean north of it are not 
critical areas of Indian influence.22  Similarly, the western Indian Ocean is also not vitally 
important to the Indians even though they have made inroads over the past two decade 
with several nations that lie on the western littorals. The NIOA is India’s strategic 
backyard and makes up a large part of its sphere of influence.  
C. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE NIOA 
Chinese presence in the NOIA was almost universally viewed as a loss by the 
INSE. As Chinese influence increased in the region throughout the 1990s, beginning with 
support for Myanmar and Pakistan, the naval strategy and doctrine that served India’s 
interests since independence in 1948 was viewed as increasingly inadequate. The navy 
that secured the waters of the NIOA for more than four decades was put into question. 
Could the status quo strategy prevent further Chinese naval presence in the NOIA?  
Thomas Barrett noted that during the late 1990s and early 2000s debate within Indian 
naval circles coalesced around four strategic paths that the navy could pursue in the 21st 
century.   
The first option for 21st century naval strategy envisioned a navy that was 
focused strictly on coastal defense and deterrence. The second option was a sea denial 
strategy similar to what the former Soviet Union employed. The third option called for a 
                                                 
22 Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990  (New Delhi: 
Lancer 2005). 228–29. 
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navy that was superior to any navy in the NIOA littoral and was capable of maintaining 
regional stability. This was considered to be the status quo option. The final option put 
forth a vision for a blue water navy that was capable of operating as a part of a larger 
coalition. 
Barrett dubbed the blue water navy strategic option as the ‘most ambitious’ and 
what makes it so is the myriad risks involved in its implementation. In what follows, it 
will be shown that the INSE has supported a blue water naval strategy over the other 
strategies and that Prospect Theory provides the best explanation as to why this is the 
case.   
D. THEORIES TO EXPLAIN THE CHANGE IN INDIAN NAVAL 
DOCTRINE   
1. Prospect Theory 
Prospect Theory is a model to explain choices made under conditions of risk. 
Prospect theory emerged as an alternative to the expected utility theory of rational choice. 
Expected utility theory underpins the bulk of theoretical work in economics, international 
relations, political science and a number of other fields. Under expected utility, each 
choice presented to a decision maker would be the product of its value and the probability 
of attaining the item evaluated. Comparison between multiple alternatives is done on an 
absolute basis and whichever option has the highest expected utility would be the one 
chosen. There have been numerous applications of expected utility reasoning ranging 
from cost-benefit analysis to nuclear deterrence theory. A critical difference between 
choices made using expected utility reasoning to those predicted by prospect theory is 
that there is no frame of reference under expected utility; options are only better or worse 
than other options not better or worse as compared to a previous state. Prospect theory 
posits that choices are evaluated from a reference point and coded as losses or gains in 
addition to being weighted probability of attainment. Prospect Theory predicts that actors 
will be more likely to accept risk to restore a lost position. In the case of the String of 
Pearls, the INSE considered increasing Chinese presence in the NIOA as a loss and, as a 
result, were willing to adopt a blue water naval doctrine as the riskiest alternative to 
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restore the status quo position in the waters of south Asia. I will present a detailed 
analysis applying Prospect Theory in Chapter V. 
2. Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics 
Chinese engagement in South Asia can be utilized as an alarm bell rung by 
members of influential bureaucracies to wring more resources from an Indian 
government that is balancing competing priorities. These resources can then be utilized as 
levers against South Asian states to maintain Indian dominance and to enhance the 
prestige and autonomy of the bureaucracies that yield them.23  Bureaucratic politics 
explanations for recent Indian strategy in South Asia are unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. 
First, the Indian military has been purposely marginalized in the policy formation 
process by civilian officials since independence. In the years immediately following 
independence fear of the influence of a powerful military establishment caused early 
political leaders to weaken the military by decentralizing the command structure and 
establishing decision making processes that did not include military input.24  The military 
lacks influence in New Delhi in general and the navy in particular losses out to the army 
in the imagination of Indian policymakers. Many commentators recognize that when the 
military is heard, input from the Indian army dominates the formation of security 
policy.25  Barnett described the Indian navy as “powerless” compared to army and air 
force influence within the Ministry of Defense.26  Spending on the Indian navy has 
increased since 1998 in addition to its share of the military budget, however this increase 
was part of a larger trend of increased military spending.27  The navy has been able to 
                                                 
23 Graham T. Allison and H. Halperin Morton, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications,” World Politics, no. 24 (1972);   H. Halperin Morton, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: 
Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics 25, no. 1 (1972); Daniel 
W. Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” American Journal of 
Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000). 
24 Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 173–76. 
25 Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming India’s Military Modernization  
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 150. 
26 Thomas Barnett, “India’s 12 Steps to a World Class Navy,” Proceedings 127, no. 7 (2001). 
27 Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming India’s Military Modernization, 16–23. 
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carve out a piece of the budgetary largesse that has been thrown the military’s way during 
the 21st century. The argument that the navy has changed its strategy in order to lobby 
for more resources is not correlated with changes in the navy’s share of the budget. The 
navy began to garner a larger share of the budget in beginning in 1999, peaking at 
18.95% by 2007.28   The codification of the naval strategy did not occur until 2004 with 
the publication of the Indian Maritime Doctrine.   The navy’s budget share has never 
exceeded 20%.   The navy has not been able to use the change in naval strategy as a 
catalyst to influence political parties to specifically advocate for increase maritime power. 
No Indian political party has made naval spending a central campaign issue in the way 
that Ronald Reagan promised to build a “400 ship navy” for the U.S. in the early 1980s.  
There has not been a great deal of clamor on behalf of the Indian navy from the 
private sector. Given the fact that a significant portion of the Indian defense industry is 
state owned, there is not a powerful private sector lobby that seeks to increase the navy’s 
budget share.29 
The other aspect of the bureaucratic politics line of reasoning is the idea that the 
Indian navy used strategy development as a lever to increase its autonomy vis a vis the 
other services. The Indian military services are parochial; there has been a concerted 
effort to increase the joint operating capability of the military over the past decade.30  
Each service has developed their strategy and doctrine with very little feedback from or 
consideration of the other services. The Indian Air Force published their Air Power 
Doctrine in 1995 followed by the Indian Maritime Doctrine and Indian Army Doctrine in 
2004, however there is no overarching Indian military strategy document. Each service 
develops policy, strategy and doctrine in a vacuum. To say that the change in strategy 




                                                 
28 Ibid., 16. 
29 Ibid., 91. 
30 Ibid., 150–54. 
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face of the fact that since independence, each Indian military service has always exhibited 
a great deal of autonomy.31  This autonomy extends to procurement, facilities 
management and other support functions. 
3. Response to Threat 
The neorealist international relations paradigm houses theories that posit that 
India is pursuing rational strategies to prevent a balancing coalition involving China and 
the other small South Asian states from forming in its neighborhood.32  In this context, 
actions taken by India to counter the rise of Chinese power or the threat of the Chinese 
military operating in the Indian Ocean region can be viewed through the lens of Sino-
Indian security competition. These predictions are problematic because, at the end of the 
day, Chinese engagement in South Asia for the most part has not been military in nature; 
no mutual defense treaties between China and other small south Asian states have been 
signed nor has a Chinese centered military alliance been formed. Unlike Europe during 
the Cold War, India is not faced with a hostile alliance in its near abroad. I will show in a 
subsequent chapter that there is no actual naval threat posed by Chinese presence in the 
NIOA. 
E. STUDY LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Most studies that have used Prospect Theory to explain policy outcomes have 
focused on individual decision makers. The historical record has been used to prove that 
a national leader’s thought process and ultimate decision in response to a crisis is better 
explained by Prospect Theory than by expected utility rational choice. This study applies 
Prospect Theory to the strategic decisions made by a group. The key to Prospect Theory’s 
applicability in this case is to adequately establish that all members of the INSE have the 
same reference point regarding India’s strategic position in the NOIA. As Mcdermott 
points out, once a reference point is established for an individual, his choice behavior will 
be predictable. If a crisis or series of events places an individual in the domain of losses, 
                                                 
31 This autonomy extends to military matters only. 
32 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen Walt, 
The Origins of Alliances  (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
 13
he will be risk acceptant when presented with options to improve his lot. 
Correspondingly, if the INSE are operating from the same historic reference point 
regarding India’s role in the INSE, they should all view Chinese presence in the NOIA as 
a loss in strategic position. Indian naval strategists operating in the domain of losses will 
propose a risky strategy, government officials operating in the domain of losses are will 
to support risky strategy and private sector actors operating in the domain of losses would 
be willing to promote a risky strategy even if the expected utility of the strategy is lower 
than other available options.   
This study is not arguing that the INSE sought to arrive at consensus on the 
implication of Chinese presence in the NOIA and the appropriate response. Instead of 
groupthink, the shared reference point of the propriety of Indian dominance of south Asia 
in general and in the waters of the NOIA in particular is what has created a shared 
narrative among disparate groups in the Indian security establishment. The proliferation 
of the narrative of the erosion of Indian influence and Chinese dominance of the NIOA, 
preceded by Chinese naval bases in the littorals is what allowed for the blue water Indian 
naval doctrine (the riskiest option) to emerge.   
Unlike many studies that apply Prospect Theory,33 this study does not present 
evidence of a meeting or series of meetings where policymakers are sequestered in a 
room evaluating each strategic option and arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, 
documentation of such deliberations is not readily available. Instead, I present evidence 
from government documents, media accounts, articles and other writings that a doctrinal 
choice was made and is currently being implemented.  
                                                 
33 McDermott has four case studies in her book and the other writings that examine a single case rely 
heavily on biographical testimony and focus on the decision-making of one key leader, often, the President 
of the United States. McDermott, Risk Taking in International Politics Propect Theory in American 
Foreign Policy., Barbara Farnham, “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory,” 
Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992)., Mark L. Haas, “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001)., J. S. Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political 
Science,” Synthese 135, no. 2 (2003).  
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F. DEFINITIONS 
The INSE is a subset of government officials and analysts from influential think 
tanks that work in the area of security. In this study, the INSE will be limited to the Prime 
Minister, Chief of Staffs of the Army, Navy, Air force, the Minister of Defense, the 
Minister of External Affairs, the National Security Advisor and analysts from the Center 
for Policy Research and the Institute for Defense Analysis. 
G. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II is an overview of the Indian navy 
from 1948–1990. This chapter outlines the green water doctrine of the Indian navy and 
how it enabled India to maintain the strongest navy in the NIOA. Chapter III explains the 
salient features of current Indian naval doctrine in order to show that a blue water 
doctrine has been endorsed by the INSE.  .Chapter IV explores the nature of Chinese 
presence in the NIOA. Additionally, the idea that these activities make up a military 
threat will be tested in this chapter. In Chapter V, I present an analysis of the problem 









II. INDIAN NAVY 1948–2000 
The Indian navy pursued a consistent strategy for 50 years after Indian 
independence. While some of its officers may have desired a larger role for the navy, 
resource constraints coupled with the geopolitical realities of India’s threats emanating 
from the northern part of the subcontinent shaped a modest, defensive role for the navy. 
In what follows, it will be shown that policy statements, operational history and 
procurement patterns all support a naval strategy that was primarily defensive but focused 
also on buttressing India’s role as the main regional power in south Asia through relative 
naval superiority. 
A. INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY 1948–2000 
The newly independent Republic of India had to forge an appropriate military 
strategy to protect its interests in concert with economic growth and development. The 
primary threat that emerged immediately following independence was from neighboring 
Pakistan. With India inheriting the bulk of military infrastructure from the defunct British 
Raj it possessed a significant military advantage over Pakistan. The threat from the newly 
emergent People’s Republic of China was not readily apparent in the 1940s or 50s. After 
China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950, India shared a 3400 kilometer34 contested border. 
The Chinese communist regime did not recognize the treaties that demarcated the border 
setting the stage for a slow escalation of tension with India through the 1950s that 
culminated with the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India’s humiliating defeat in this conflict 
crystallized the threat that the Chinese could pose to its northern heartland. The Chinese-
Pakistan axis that emerged in the early 1960s further focused the eyes of Indian military 
strategists and policymakers on continental defense. The Chinese Navy was not a player 
in the Indian Ocean until mid-1980s.   
The British navy was the premier force in the Indian Ocean for more than a 
decade after Indian independence. After Britain declared that it would focus its naval 
operations west of the Suez Canal in 1968, America assumed the mantle of ensuring 
                                                 
34 “Annual Report 2007–08”  (Institute for Conflict Management, 2008), 28. 
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security of major Eastern shipping lanes including those running through the Indian 
Ocean.35  The Indian Ocean was a peripheral theater of competition during the early 
decades of the Cold War. Both superpowers focused their energy on controlling the 
waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean and Arctic.36   
The naval strategy formulated by Indian policymakers in the years immediately 
following independence would be followed by in large until the 21s century. The primary 
sources of the strategy were the 10 Year Naval Development Plan produced by 
Commander N. Krishan at the Plans Directorate in Navy Headquarters and a report on 
defense production written by Professor P.M.S. Blackett.37  The overarching theme of 
both documents was the call for the Indian navy to be designed for defense rather than 
power projection. 
Professor Blackett’s report was commissioned by 1948 by Prime Minister Nehru 
and served as an instrument for the civilian bureaucracy to influence military strategy. 
The Blackett report framed future maritime strategy within the context of economic 
development and recommended a limited role for the Indian navy. Blackett recommended 
the following objectives for the Indian navy: 
 Protection of coastal shipping against mining, submarines, surface and air 
attack, with the capability to respond in kind. 
 Escorting and protecting a small number of ocean convoys between Aden 
and Singapore but no further (merchant shipping was important for the 
development of trade and a valuable national asset). 
 Co-operation with the Army and the Air Force in repelling landing 
operations and advances along coastlines, and to be able to undertake 




                                                 
35 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990: 8. 
36 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security  (London: Brassey’s, 1995). 36., Ashley J. 
Tellis, “The Naval Balance in the Indian Subcontinent,” Asian Survey 25, no. 12 (1985): 1190. 
37 Vice Admiral N. Krishnan, A Sailor’s Story (New Delhi: Punya Publishing, 2011). 177–79; G. M. 
Hiranandani, “Indian Navy 1945–1976,”  http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/book/export/html/950, . Professor 
Blackett was a British scientist who was a leading light in physics and operational research. 
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The objectives of the navy stipulated in the 10-year plan (1947) were as follows: 
 To safeguard Indian shipping. 
 To ensure that supplies could reach and leave by sea in all circumstances. 
 To prevent an enemy landing on India’s shores 
 To support the Army in sea borne operations. 
Decades later, several wars with Pakistan did not change the security 
establishment’s view of the role of the Indian navy. Admiral S. N. Kohli, former Chief of 
Staff of the Indian Navy outlined the objectives of the Indian navy in 1978: 
 Protecting the Indian coastline and island territories from attack 
 Protecting offshore interests 
 Protecting Indian sea lines of communication 
Similarly, the objectives outlined in the Navy 30 Year Perspective Plan of 1982 were: 
 Inflict decisive punishment on any regional Navy in war and to raise the 
threshold against intervention by foreign powers. 
 Ensure the safe movement of trade to and from Indian ports and the 
unhindered exploration and exploitation of offshore resources. 
 Help small friendly littorals by creating amphibious sealift capability. 
Serious discussion on expanding the limited role of the navy did not occur until 
the turn of the century. 
B.  APPLICATION OF INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 1947–2000 
1. Indo-Pakistan War 1965 
The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, while fought to a stalemate on the ground, was an 
embarrassment for the Indian navy. A Pakistani naval squadron bombarded the city of 
Dwarka on 7 September 1965 and in general, the Pakistan navy went largely 
unchallenged throughout the war. The Indian navy’s failure to engage the Pakistani navy 
was blamed on the fact that after being largely employed in the Bay of Bengal38 prior to  
 
                                                 
38 A large portion of the Indian navy was deployed to the Bay of Bengal in response to Indonesian 
incursions into the Andaman and Nicobar island chain in 1964. 
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hostilities, the ships of the Indian fleet were conducting replenishment and maintenance 
in Bombay and, as a result, were not able to defend the western Indian coast against 
Pakistani naval attack.39 
2. Indo-Pakistan War 1971 
The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War demonstrated the efficacy of first generation Indian 
naval strategy. The Indian Navy’s role in the conflict was to support the ground operation 
conducted by the Indian Army and Air Force. In keeping with objective of providing 
support to the Indian army from the sea outlined in the 1948 10 Year Plan, the navy 
leveraged its numerical superiority to establish control of critical areas in the north 
Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Bengal.   
The Indian Navy held a significant advantage over Pakistan in terms of the 
number and quality of surface vessels. Vice Admiral Krishan noted that the fleet that was 
envisaged in the 10 Year Plan was not realized until the late 1960s.40  This force while 
weak in the area of submarine and anti-submarine warfare was composed of an aircraft 
carrier, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 8 frigates and 8 Russian made missile boats and 
4 submarines as its war fighting core.41 
Operationally, at the onset of the war, the Indian navy was split between Eastern 
and Western Naval Commands. The Western Command was the main effort and was 
tasked with blockading the port of Karachi and engaging the main Pakistani naval force. 
The mission of the Eastern Command was to assist in providing air support to Indian 
ground forces in East Pakistan. The Eastern fleet was centered around aircraft carrier INS 
Vikrant and dominated the waters of the Bay of Bengal, bombing airstrips and targets of 
opportunity in East Pakistan. In addition, the task force established sea control preventing 
the escape of Pakistani Army by sea. There was no significant surface or air threat to 
Vikrant group throughout the campaign.42 
                                                 
39 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990: 19–21.   
40 Krishnan, A Sailor’s Story 181. 
41 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990: 25–27. 
42 Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security: 68–69.  Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The 
Indian Navy 1976–1990: 22–23. 
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In the Western theater, the Indian navy employed a task force of destroyers, 
cruisers and frigates to combat Pakistan’s main naval force. Small Russian made missile 
boats employing anti-ship missiles proved deadly, sinking a Pakistani destroyer and 
minesweeper on the night of December 4th near the Port of Karachi. Another missile boat 
attack on the night of December 8th damaged Karachi port facilities and an anchored oil 
tanker. These attacks convinced Pakistan naval command to keep its surface combatant 
vessels along the pier in Karachi Port and out of the fight. The Pakistani air force did not 
pose a threat to Western Fleet operations. 
Pakistan’s naval advantage just before the outbreak of hostilities was in the area 
of submarines. The submarine arm could have allowed Pakistan to seriously challenge 
Indian sea control if timely intelligence tracking Indian fleet movements was exploited. 
The INS Khukri, the only Indian surface vessel lost to enemy action during the conflict, 
was sunk on December 9th by the Pakistani submarine Hangor near the Bombay coast. 
Anti-submarine operations following the sinking of the Khukri were not able to locate the 
Hangor or any other Pakistani submarine. There was a great deal of consternation at 
Indian Naval Headquarters during the months leading up to the conflict as to whether or 
not to employ India’s only aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in the upcoming war because 
of its vulnerability to Pakistan’s submarines. These concerns factored into the decision to 
deploy the Vikrant to the Bay of Bengal instead of the north Arabian Sea. A well-
conceived deception operation conducted by the Eastern Fleet  led the Pakistani 
submarine Ghazni away from the carrier task force and led to its destruction outside of 
Vishankhapatnam port on 4 December.43  The Ghazni could have done significant 
damage to the Vikrant task force because, due to the Indian navy’s primitive anti-
submarine capability, it was highly vulnerable to subsurface attack. Overall, the Pakistani 
submarine force was underutilized during the war.   
The Indian Navy was able to establish effective sea control of the sea approaches 
to East and West Pakistan by the 10 December. The 1971 war presented India with the  
 
                                                 
43 Krishnan, A Sailor’s Story 360–61. 
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opportunity to establish the regional navy hierarchy. India’s navy overcame maintenance 
challenges and capability gaps to confirm its dominant position as south Asia’s primary 
naval power. 
3. Indian Peace Keeping Force 
At the request of the Sri Lankan government, the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) was deployed to northern Sri Lanka on July 30th, 1987 to combat LTTE 
insurgents. The naval component of the peacekeeping operation, Operation Parwan, 
leveraged India’s regional maritime superiority to disrupt LTTE communication with 
southern India and to transport India troops, equipment and supplies into the Sri Lanka. 
On average, the navy deployed (4) surface combatants to support the operation.44  The 
Indian navy’s control of the waters surrounding northern Sri Lanka (Palk Bay, Palk 
Strait, Gulf of Manor) set the conditions for the successful interdiction of LTTE ships 
smuggling weapons and personnel to and from southern India. In addition, Indian Marine 
Commandos were active on shore, conducting raids against LTTE base camps and 
vessels. Naval air assets conducted reconnaissance and other support to the deployed 
force. The LTTE’s seagoing force of small patrol boats was no match for Indian naval 
power in the area. Operation Parwan resulted in the (76) militant boats destroyed, (139) 
boats captured and more than (15000) incidents / interceptions. No Indian ships were lost 
to hostile fire during Operation Parwan.45 
4. Support for the Maldivian Government during the 1988 Coup  
In 1988, the Indian Navy supported the defense of the Maldivian government 
following an attempted coup by Sri Lankan mercenaries. Maritime Operation CACTUS 
was conducted 4–5 November 1988 to intercept an escaping cargo ship carrying the 
mercenaries in addition to hostages. After being flushed from Male by a detachment of 
Indian soldiers that was airlifted to the Maldives on the night of 3 November, the 
mercenaries seized the cargo ship Progress Light and set course for Sri Lanka. The Indian 
                                                 
44 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990: 192–96. 
45 Ibid. 
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Navy intercepted the Progress Light and facilitated hostage negotiations by embarking a 
hostage negotiation team onboard the frigate Godavari and ratcheting up pressure on the 
mercenaries through an escalating series of warning and disabling fire. After a well-
placed shell disabled the Progress Light, a naval boarding party rescued the hostages and 
captured the mercenaries. Operation CACTUS was unique in that it featured Indian 
combat operations initiated further from home shores than any time in its history.46 
5. Kargil War 
The Kargil War was a limited conflict between India and Pakistan over disputed 
territory in Kashmir. The Indian navy deployed naval assets in anticipation of the conflict 
escalating to a major war. Ships from the Indian Eastern Fleets joined those from the 
Western Fleet to conduct surveillance off of the Pakistani coast and training in addition to 
securing offshore assets. Indian ships deployed in the north Arabian Sea forced Pakistan 
to conduct escorts of its oil tankers beginning in June. By the end of the conflict in early 
July, the Indian navy had successfully deterred Pakistan’s navy from operating along 
India’s coast and threatening shipping lanes.47  
Other Missions 
The Indian navy has participated in several U. N. sponsored peacekeeping 
missions during the early 1990s.48  In addition to peacekeeping initiatives, the Indian 
navy has participated in several anti-piracy / anti-smuggling operations in the Indian 
Ocean littoral region during this period as well.49   
C. INDIA NAVY BUDGET 1948–2000 
The limited role endorsed by policymakers for the Indian navy was reflected in 
the military budget for almost 50 years post-independence. The navy consistently 
                                                 
46 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990: 199–200. 
47 Transition to Guardianship The Indian Navy 1991–2000  (Lancer, 2009). 66–67. 
48 The Indian Navy supported Indian ground forces primarily with transportation to and from theater. 
Naval operations MUFFET, SHIELD AND BOLSTER provided lift to Indian troops and equipment into 
and out of Somalia during U.N. Operation RESTORE HOPE. 
49 Hiranandani, Transition to Guardianship The Indian Navy 1991–2000: 52–60. 
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received less than 15% of budget share; a share in the single digits was the rule rather 
than the exception (Table 1). With India’s primary security threats arising from the 
northern part of the subcontinent, spending on the navy was lower in priority than the 
army and air force. Implementation of the 10 year plan was facilitated by rising levels of 
naval spending in the 1950s. Naval budget share rose from 4.7% in 1951 to a high of 
11.7% in 1960–61. India’s loss to China in the 1962 war prompted a sharp cut in naval 
spending to 3.4% of budget share in 1963–64. The navy’s role in the victory over 
Pakistan in 1971 was rewarded with an increasing budget share throughout the 1970s for 
additional ship purchases and other upgrades. The naval budget share rose to 9.65% by 
1977–78 and averaged around 9% throughout the early 1980s. The mid-1980s heralded 
an uptick in naval spending resulting in the naval budget share increasing to from 12.5% 
in 1985–86 to 13.5% by 1989–90. This budget increase was spurred by the necessity to 
replace ageing surface ships and invest modern submarines and to enhance naval 
aviation.50  India’s second aircraft carrier, INS Viraat was purchased and inducted during 
this period.51  Due to the Indian navy’s reliance on foreign hardware, these gains were 
undermined by high inflation and low foreign reserve levels stemming from the 1987 
food crisis and 1991 Gulf War.52  A decline in naval budget share began in the 1990s 
falling to 11.2 percent by 1992–93. In comparison, during the 1980s the Indian army’s 
share of the defense budget averaged 59.7% and the Indian air force averaged 22.8% of 
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Indian Navy 1991–2000: 20. 
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Table 1.   Indian Navy Budget Share54 
D. INDIAN NAVAL PROCUREMENT 1948–2000 
Naval ship procurement was subject to low budgetary allocation and strategic 
priority. Despite these obstacles naval planners succeeded in building a force that 
maintained naval superiority in the waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. At 
independence the Indian navy was made up of ships that were discarded from the British 
navy; in 1947 the Indian navy possessed only 3 major warships, (2) frigates and 
(1) corvette in addition to 30 other vessels.55  Using the 10 year plan as a template, naval 
                                                 
54 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security  (London: Brassey’s, 1995). 
55 http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/book/export/html/950 
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shipbuilding and procurement was driven by the goal to establish an Indian fleet that had 
suitable mix of frigates, cruisers, destroyers, submarines  and other support ships. Not 
surprisingly, Britain was India’s primary supplier of naval hardware during the 1950s 
(Table 2). India purchased destroyers, cruisers and minesweepers from Britain. Britain 
also supplied India’s first aircraft carrier from Britain in 1957.   Britain continued to 
supply India with naval hardware into the 1980s including Sea Harriers multipurpose 
aircraft, Sea King helicopters as well as the aircraft carrier, INS Viraat.56  Beginning in 
the 1960s the Soviet Union became a primary supplier of ships, weapons, aircraft and 
other systems to the Indian navy.57  Starting with the purchase of patrol boats in 1965, the 
Soviets supplied the Indian navy with submarines, anti-submarine vessels, missile boats, 
guided missile destroyers and naval aircraft. Soviet technology was the primary 
foundation upon which the naval expansion of the 1980s was built.58  The Indian navy 
commissioned several new ships during the 1980s, upgrading just about every class of 
vessel. New guided missile destroyers, minesweepers and missile boats were acquired 
from Russia.59   
After being harried by Pakistani submarines during the 1971 war, India turned its 
sights toward strengthening its submarine force. The navy purchased (8) Kilo class 
Russian submarines an inducted them into service from 1986–1990. The Kilo is designed 
for anti-submarine and anti-shipping operations in littoral areas. The navy also purchased 
the Type 1500 diesel submarine from German supplier HDW. The Indians purchased 
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57 G. C. Thomas Raju, “The Indian Navy in the Seventies,” Pacific Affairs 48, no. 4 (1975–1976): 502. 
58 Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security: 130–31. 
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 Ship Type Quantity Country of Origin Year 
Destroyers 3 Britain 1948 
  3 Britain 1953 
  3 Russia 1980–83 
  2 Russia 1986–87 
Cruiser 1 Britain 1948 
  1 Britain 1957 
Frigates 3 Britain 1958–59 
Submarines 4 Russia 1967–69 
  4 Russia 1973–74 
  2 Germany 1986 
  7 Russia 1986–90 
Aircraft Carrier 1 Britain 1961 
  1 Britain 1987 
Missile Boat 8 Russia 1971 
  8 Russia 1976–77 
Fleet Tanker 1 Germany 1967 
Landing Ship (Tank) 1 Britain 1949 
  2 Russia 1966 
  4 Poland 1975–76 
  4 Poland 1984–86 
 
Table 2.   Indian Navy Foreign Procurement60 
Britain remained the primary supplier of naval aircraft, providing both the 
workhorse carrier based fighter and general purpose helicopter, the Harrier and the Sea 
King, respectively.61  The 1990s saw a dramatic slowdown in Indian ship procurement.62   
Indigenization of ship building began in the early 1960s with the nationalization 
of the subsidiaries of certain Western shipbuilding conglomerates based in India.63  These 
acquisitions were developed into Mazgon Dockyard Ltd, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and 
Goa Shipyard (Table 3). By 1968, Mazgon was delivering Leander class frigates to the 
                                                 
60 Hiranandani, Transition to Guardianship The Indian Navy 1991–2000: 20–24.. 
61 The first batch of 6 Harriers was delivered in 1983 and the last of 23 total aircraft was inducted in 
1992. Transition to Guardianship The Indian Navy 1991–2000: 154. 
62 David Scott, “India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean Mahanian Visions,” Asa-Pacific 
Review 13, no. 2 (2006): 130. 
63 Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security: 156. 
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Indian navy. Since the delivery of this first indigenous ship, Indian shipyards have 
produced many classes of ships including frigates, destroyers, submarines, corvettes, 
landing ships (tank), fleet tankers among others.64  The lessons learned during the austere 
budgetary periods experienced by the Indian navy poised the Indian shipbuilding 
complex to tackle more sophisticated naval construction projects in the 21st century. For 
example, Project 17 was initiated in 1994 to build frigates that incorporate complex 
technologies such as stealth signature reduction design features.65 
 
Ship Type Quantity Shipyard Year 
Destroyers 2 Mazagon 1991–93 
Frigates 3 Mazagon 1980–84 
Submarines 2 Mazagon 1989–92 
Corvettes 4 Mazagon 1986–91 
  3 Garden Reach 1988–92 
  1 Goa 1992 
Fleet Tanker 1 Garden Reach 1993 
Landing Ship (Tank) 1 Garden Reach 1984 
 
Table 3.   Indian Navy Indigenous Ship Production66 
E. REGIONAL NAVAL SUPERIORITY–GREEN WATER NAVY OPERATONS 
India has held maritime superiority over Pakistan since the inception of both 
states in 1947 (Table 4). Pakistan was the only state in south or southeast Asia that 
possessed a navy capable of challenging India.  There have been periods when Pakistan 
held a qualitative advantage over India in certain types of vessels however, these 
advantages were short lived. For example, during the period before and immediately 
following the 1971 war, Pakistan’s submarine force was superior to India’s. India quickly 
worked to neutralize this advantage by enhancing its anti-submarine warfare capabilities 
and acquiring Kilo class submarines. 
                                                 
64 Hiranandani, Transition to Eminence The Indian Navy 1976–1990,125–26. 
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  India Pakistan
1947 7 4 
1971 35 16 
1987 64 38 
 
Table 4.   India Pakistan Navy Comparison67 
Despite is budgetary challenges, India was able to build a navy which was the 
strongest of any state in the region and maintained its status as the south Asia’s strongest 
power. The maintenance of this balance was not emphasized in policy documents,  
The Indian navy was able to construct a capable force that was able to fulfill 
policy objectives and to dominate the waters of the NIOA. Chinese presence and 
influence in the NIOA began in 1985 and accelerated steady through the 1990s and into 
the 21st century. 
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III. 21ST CENTURY NAVAL DOCTRINE 
The information in this chapter illustrates that the Indian national security elite 
endorsed a blue water naval doctrine. The establishment has supported this strategy 
intellectually, financially and through operations and training. The Indian navy 
foreshadowed the large scale commitment to its blue water strategy in the 1990s by 
establishing links to foreign navies, most notably, the U.S. navy. Since the decision to 
pursue a blue water naval strategy was made in the early 21st century, activities such port 
calls to areas outside of the Indian Ocean region and training with international militaries 
has increased dramatically. Naval construction and procurement patterns support the idea 
that the goal of the Indian navy is to project power far from its home shores.   
A. NAVAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1990S 
In the early 1990s, the Indian navy began to expand its horizons and operate in 
wider waters than those that surround the subcontinent. The U.S. initiated contact with 
the Indian navy in 1991 by proposing a set of measures that would increase mutual 
understanding as well as interoperability. The Kickleighter proposals68 opened the door 
of cooperation between the U.S. and Indian navies.69  The proposals resulted in the 
establishment of committees for peer to peer collaboration and the initiation of the 
MALABAR series of exercises.70  The MALABAR exercises were the first instance 
where the U.S. and Indian navies trained together.71  This early cooperation between the 
Indian and U.S. navies was short lived because of sanctions imposed by the U.S. in 
response to Indian nuclear weapons testing in 1998. Indian—U.S. naval cooperation and 
training resumed in 2002.72   
                                                 
68 These proposals were named after Lt. General Claude Kickleighter, the former commander of U.S. 
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In conjunction with increased contact with Western navies, the Indian navy also 
reached out to their south and southeast Asian counterparts.  Beginning in 1995, the 
Indian navy played host to the navies of countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Singapore at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The MILAN73 
conferences were initiated to facilitate understanding and cooperation between the Indian 
navy and other regional navies. MILAN conferences were held in 1995, 1997 and 1999 
and continue on a bi annual basis.74 
These efforts were tentative first steps of what evolved into a comprehensive 
naval strategy for the 21st century. While the navy never gave up on its Mahan/Panikkar 
inspired vision the Indian navy possessing sea control capability, the cold reality is that 
the Indian navy of the 1990s was in a state of disrepair.   Top naval leadership and the 
national security elite were not committed to turning the Indian navy into a force that 
could do more than ply the waves of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. The 1990s 
ended a period where ship decommissioning proceeded at a vociferous rate and capital 
upgrades were more than a half decade behind schedule.75   Between 1986 and 1996, no 
new orders were placed for ships.76  Indian admirals decried that modernization started in 
the 1980s was “setback” and that the function of the navy was “forgotten.”77   
The strategic outlook of India’s navy began to change in the late 1990s as the 
election of the BJP led government reopened the conversation about India’s place in the 
world during the new millennium and the role of the Indian armed services.78  Given 
their desire to leverage Indian economic growth to transform India from a doggedly Third 
World state into a contender for global power and influence, the BJP government was 
more likely to support increased military spending and to tolerate an increase in military 
influence. The Indian navy took advantage of this opportunity to outline a strategic 
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choice that differed from the status quo of South Asian naval dominance and instead 
advocated a larger blue water navy capable of working in concert with other major 
navies.   
The 1998 a strategy paper drafted by the navy titled, Strategic Defense Review: 
The Maritime Dimension – A Naval Vision outlined a more substantial role for the Indian 
navy moving forward. The strategic choice outlining a international, blue water Indian 
navy was presented to policymakers as the path to follow to meet 21st century 
challenges. The report envisions a powerful Indian Navy that would “ 
have sufficient maritime power not only to be able to defend and further 
India’s maritime interests, but also to deter a military maritime challenge 
posed by any littoral nation, or combination of littoral nations of the 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and also to be able to significantly raise the 
threshold of intervention or coercion by extra-regional powers.”  In 
addition the navy would ..”..be increasingly used to support national 
diplomatic initiatives in the region and beyond.”  The overarching 
objective of naval strategy would be to ..”.consolidate its maritime power 
over the next 25 years.”79   
B. THE INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE–CODIFICATION OF BLUE 
WATER STRATEGY 
By the middle of the 2000s the new Indian naval strategy was fully formed and 
expressed in a series of doctrinal and strategy documents. The Indian Navy Maritime 
Strategy was published in 2004 and was the clearest expression of Indian naval strategy 
and intent to date. This document was updated in 2009. The navy that was outlined in the 
Maritime Doctrine was blue water in scope with an eye toward interoperability within a 
larger naval coalition. 
One of most glaring breaks from the naval strategy of past decades that was 
outlined in the Maritime Doctrine was the greatly expanded area of interest set forth for 
the Indian navy. Instead of a narrow focus on home water defense the Maritime Doctrine 
declares that the new areas of interest range from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of 
Malacca. The primary areas of interest are: 1) Maritime Zones of India; 2) the Arabian 
Sea and Bay of Bengal; 3) the choke points that serve as access points to the Indian 
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Ocean; 4) the Persian Gulf; 5) international shipping lanes crossing the Indian Ocean and 
the island countries located in their vicinity.80  These primary areas of interest are 
supplemented by secondary areas identified as: 1) the southern Indian Ocean; 2) the Red 
Sea and its littoral states ; 3) the South China Sea and other areas of the west Pacific 
Ocean and certain littoral nations located within the area; 4) “other areas” based on 
location of Indian Diaspora and overseas investments.81  The first two primary areas of 
interest encompass the terrain that the Indian navy has traditionally sought to retain 
dominance. Every other area outlined represents a significant expansion of the navy’s 
operating range and responsibility.   
The Maritime Doctrine lists several ‘enabling concepts’ that will allow the Indian 
navy to operate effectively within its expanded areas of interest. The central enabling 
concept is sea control. Sea control is defined as the ability of a navy to solely operate 
within a defined areas while simultaneously denying that area to an adversary.82  Sea 
control is three dimensional and includes the sea surface, subsurface and airspace. The 
Indian navy has only had the capability to exercise sea control in limited circumstances 
against south Asian adversaries. The sea control capability that is called for in the 
Maritime Doctrine is designed to be effective against ‘extra regional’ powers in addition 
to south Asian threats. Sea control is put forth as ‘the central concept around which the 
Indian navy is structured’.83  Sea denial as a competing strategy is relegated in the 
Maritime Doctrine to secondary importance as a component of a sea control.84   
Several additional concepts are outlined in the Maritime Doctrine that describe 
essential capabilities that the Indian navy is seeking to strengthen or develop.   The 
Doctrine calls the capability to interdict an adversary’s Sea Lanes of Communication  
 
                                                 
80 Indian Maritime Doctrine: 67–68. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 77. 
84 Ibid. 
 33
(SLOC) crucial to “weaken the enemy’s war waging ability.”85  The SLOCs that pass 
through the Indian Ocean are extremely important to east and southeast Asian nations, 
especially China.   
1. Power Projection 
Power projection  is an important capability that is outlined in the Maritime 
Doctrine that, if fully developed, would place the Indian navy in an exclusive club. 
According to Ladwig, power projection is “[t]he ability of a nation to apply all or some of 
its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to 
rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations 
to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”86  
Ladwig describes military power projection in nine dimensions: 1) securing lines of 
communication; 2) noncombatant evacuation operations; 3) humanitarian assistance; 4) 
peacekeeping; 5) showing the flag; 6) compellence / deterrence; 7) punishment; 8) armed 
intervention; 9) conquest.   Ladwig describes the first four aspects of power projection as 
“soft” military power where force is not employed with the remainder being examples of 
hard military power.87  The Indian navy of the future will be structured around aircraft 
carrier task forces that will serve as the principle vehicle for not only sea control but for 
power projection as well. The Maritime Doctrine outlines a suite of capabilities that will 
enable power projection: 1) Amphibious Assault; 2) Expeditionary Operations; 3) Distant 
Operations.  
Amphibious Assault means projecting combat power from the sea to the shore. 
Amphibious Assault is executed to seize a beachhead to enable a follow on assault or to 
raid enemy territory from the sea. Expeditionary Operations can encompass Amphibious 
Assault but are differentiated by the conduct of sustained operations ashore. There is a 
considerable logistics component to Expeditionary Operations because these operations 
are designed to allow forces to originate from the sea and to operate on foreign soil for an 
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undetermined amount of time. The Maritime Doctrine identifies Distant Operations as 
being those conducted at ‘considerable’ distance from Indian territory. Distant Operations 
rely on “access, mobility and sustenance,” in order to project power or conduct other 
tasks to serve national interests. The identification of these power projection capabilities 
is a significant departure from a navy that was concerned mostly with defense of waters 
in the Indian near abroad.   
One could argue that Operation Jupiter88 in support of the IPKF on Sri Lanka was 
an application of power projection with rudimentary experiences in expeditionary 
operations and amphibious assault.89   However, to say that recent doctrinal development 
was necessitated by that experience is a stretch. The 15-year gap between the lessons 
learned from Operation Jupiter and the publication of the Maritime Doctrine attest to the 
fact that these power projection concepts are not simply an expression of operational 
lessons learned.  
The Indian navy has committed extensive intellectual capital to the development 
of concepts that support the objective of power projection. The publication of the Joint 
Amphibious Operations Doctrine in 2008 is a reflection of this trend.    There is only a 
select few navies in the world that can project power by means of carrier borne aircraft 
and amphibious forces. Excluding India, only 8 world militaries possess aircraft carriers, 
amphibious troops, amphibious sealift capability and support vessels.90 
The roles that the Maritime Doctrine outline for the Indian navy are Military, 
Diplomatic, Constabulary and Benign.91  The execution of these roles would be made 
possible by implementing the aforementioned enabling concepts. The objectives of the 
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Indian navy in the military role are: 1) deterrence against war; 2) decisive military 
victory; 3) securing Indian territory, offshore assets and citizens against attack from the 
sea; 4) influence affairs on land; 5) safeguard Indian mercantile trade; 6) safeguard Indian 
national security interests.92 The Military role encompasses most of what the Indian navy 
has traditionally done; deterring military aggression from the sea, protecting home waters 
and Indian shipping. In contrast, the current set of objectives requires a more muscular 
naval capability. The call for the Indian navy to achieve ‘decisive military victory’ 
harkens back to the Mahanian school of thought and is not keeping with the traditional 
role of the post-independence navy. In addition, the doctrine veers into ambitious 
territory by calling for an Indian navy that is able to “influence events on land.”  The 
influence sought after goes far beyond supporting the Indian army by attacking the coasts 
of regional adversaries. Influence in this case involves power projection, up to and 
including the use of amphibious forces and expeditionary operations.93  
The Diplomatic role is a marked expansion of the political role of the Indian navy. 
While the Indian navy has always visited foreign ports and, since the 1990s operated 
alongside foreign navies, the articulation of the Diplomatic role in the Maritime Doctrine 
underscores the importance of international interaction in contemporary naval strategy. 
The objectives of the Diplomatic role are: 1) strengthen political relations and goodwill; 
2) strengthen defense relations; 3) portray credible defense posture and capability; 4) 
strengthen maritime security in the Indian Ocean region; 5) promote regional and global 
stability.94  The Diplomatic role lies at the heart of the international blue water naval 
strategic option and it is the main area that separates the current Maritime Doctrine from 
traditional Indian naval strategy.   
Traditional methods of Indian naval diplomacy such as goodwill visits are 
outlined in the Maritime Doctrine as an outward expression of positive diplomatic 
relations. During the first decade of the 21st century, the frequency of Indian navy visits 
outside of the Indian Ocean region has increased. The Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat 
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deployed to Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for the first time in 2005.95  The Indian 
navy now sails to Europe, East Asia, Africa and the Middle East much more than it did 
for the first 4 decades of its existence. 
The Maritime Doctrine calls for the Indian navy to positively interact with the 
navies of friendly countries through joint exercises and operations and to deter threats to 
Indian shipping.96  The Diplomatic role also takes on a global twist as the ability to 
operate under the framework of United Nations peace support operation is a stated aim.97 
The Indian navy has participated in several bi-lateral or multi-lateral naval 
exercises since the turn of the century. The Indian navy has exercised with the U.S., 
France, Russia, China, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, South Africa, Brazil, 
Singapore, Brunei and Australia from 2002–2010. Navies from countries in the western 
Indian Ocean have taken part in the MILAN exercises. The MALABAR exercises 
between the U.S. and Indian navies resumed in 2002. Russia and India have conducted 
the INDRA naval exercises since 2003. France has dispatched vessels 10 times to train 
with the Indians in the Arabian Sea, with the latest iteration of the VARUNA exercises 
conducted in 2010. Rising powers South Africa and Brazil have joined with India since 
2008 to hold the India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime (IBSAMAR) exercise. The Indian 
navy has even trained with rival China, albeit on a very limited basis, off of the Chinese 
coast in 2011.98  
With the exception of the requirement to support the Indian Army during war, the 
Constabulatory Role closely resembles the original objectives of the Indian navy set forth 
in the 10 Year Plan. The objectives o the Constabulary Role are: 1) coastal defense; 2) 
security of the Indian exclusive economic zone; 3) good order at sea.99  Counterterrorism 
and anti-piracy figure prominently under the Constabulatory Role. 
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The Benign Role is a catchall to describe the Indian navy’s vision for 
participation in humanitarian relief operations and other support tasks such as search and 
rescue.100  This role is not new to the Indian navy, however the Maritime Doctrine 
represents the first time that the objective has been codified. During the 21st century, the 
Indian navy has participated in international humanitarian relief operations.   The navy 
distinguished itself during tsunami relief operations in 2004–2005.    Thirty two ships and 
20 aircraft were deployed to assist in relief operations in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia.101  In contrast, from 1970 to 1995, the Indian navy did not participate in 
humanitarian assistance missions in response to cyclones in the south Asia region.102   
C. 21ST CENTURY PROCUREMENT SUPPORTS A BLUE WATER 
STRATEGY 
The backbone of the Indian navy under the international blue water strategy is the 
aircraft carrier. The 21st century Indian navy is to be structured around three aircraft 
carrier battle groups; one battle group would be operate from in the east and west coasts 
of Indian respectively with the third in maintenance. By the end of the 1990s, the India 
navy possessed one operational aircraft carrier. The INS Vikrant was decommissioned in 
1997, leaving only the INS Viraat as the nation’s sole aircraft carrier. In 2004, a deal was 
inked to purchase the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov.103  The Admiral 
Gorshkov is a 270 m carrier that displaces 45,000 tons; it is a medium sized carrier that is 
larger than the INS Viraat but smaller than a U.S. Nimitz class carrier. The Admiral 
Gorshkov (re-designated the INS Vikramaditya) has been docked in the Russian shipyard 
in Severodvinsk undergoing refit. The Vikramaditya is scheduled to be fully operational 
by 2012. In addition to the Vikramaditya, the Indian navy is building two more carriers 
indigenously. The Air Defense Ship (ADS) is a 225m carrier that displaces 37,500 tons 
that is currently being built by Cochin Shipyard Ltd. The ADS is scheduled for delivery 
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by 2015. The last carrier to be inducted by 2022 is another larger, ADS currently 
scheduled to begin construction in 2017.104  None of the carriers currently being 
developed are nuclear powered. 
The Indian government approved the purchase of (6) Scorpene class French 
submarines in 2005. These diesel submarines are scheduled to replace the navy’s ageing 
fleet of diesel subs, primarily Kilo class. The Scorpene subs are being built in India, 
however due to cost overruns and other delays, the delivery window has been pushed 
back to between 2015–2021. The navy inducted its only nuclear powered ballistic missile 
submarine, the INS Arihant in 2009 with plans to complete two more by 2017.105  Given 
the expressed desire of the navy to operate carrier task forces from the Persian Gulf to the 
Straits of Malacca, the absence of fast attack variant nuclear submarines from near term 
development plans is notable.   
After procuring its first Landing Port Dock (LPD) vessel in 2006, the Indian 
government approved a request to procure 4 additional LPDs. An LPD can transport up 
to 1000 soldiers in addition to associated heavy equipment and supplies over long 
distances across the open ocean.  In addition to LPDs, the Indian Navy is acquiring 
Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels. 
These smaller craft travel inside of LPDs and are designed to transport troops and 
equipment to shore. Along these same lines, a tender has been placed for Landing Craft 
Mechanized (LCM). These vessels are tracked, armored and can travel faster than LCVPs 
and LCUs. An LCM is a necessary capability to enable amphibious assault unto contested 
shores.106   
The Indian Navy’s procurement of platforms that will give its forces a true 
amphibious assault capability, however it is purchasing a capability that is already out of  
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date. The LPD design that the Indians are modeling their newest vessels on is more than 
37 years old and has already been mothballed by the U.S. Navy in favor of the newer San 
Antonio class LPDs. 
As previously noted, the navy cut deals in 2004 to and 2010 procure 45 MiG 29 
(naval variant) fighters to operate from its carriers. The first (16) MiGs were delivered in 
2004 with the remainder handed over starting in 2012. In addition, the navy asked for 
bids to replace ship borne helicopters, reconnaissance and patrol aircraft. 
The Indian navy is currently updating its destroyer, frigate and corvette force 
through a combination of foreign procurement and indigenous production. The first new 
destroyer, INS Kolkata (Project 15A) was launched in 2005. The first new frigate, INS 
Shivalik, was launched in 2003. In the case of the Kolkata class destroyers, due to 
construction delays the first ship is scheduled to be commissioned in late 2012. An order 
for 4 additional destroyers was placed in 2010 worth $6.5 billion USD. Construction 
delays also plagued the Project 17 stealth frigate program delaying the commissioning of 
ships by 5 years. The Indian navy is also upgrading its corvettes; an order for the first 
four of a series of 12 vessels was placed in 2003. The P-28 corvettes are currently under 
construction with a planned delivery date in 2015 (Table 5). It is notable that a significant 
portion of this development is indigenous including anti-ship missiles, radars and other 
sensors.   Foreign expertise was called upon to assist with modular construction 
techniques for the Shivalik class frigates.107 
                                                 
107 The information contained in this paragraph was derived from the following sources:  Arming 
Without Aiming India’s Military Modernization: 91. “World Navies, India.” 
 40
Ship Type  Quantity  Manufacturer  Under Construction?  Year Commissioned  Value* 




























Table 5.   Surface Combatant Development108
                                                 
108 Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming India’s Military Modernization  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 90–
91.  “India’s third indigenous stealth frigate INS Sahyadri commissioning on July 21,” The Economic Times, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012–
06–25/news/32409379_1_indigenous-stealth-frigate-ins-satpura-ins-shivalik.  “World Navies, India.” 
 41
D. THE INDIAN NAVAL BUDGET IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
As I have highlighted in Chapter IV, spending on the Indian naval has risen 
considerably after the year 2000.  However, despite the surge in spending, the percent 
budget share allocated to the navy has not cracked the 20% mark. In fact, by fiscal year 
2008, the allocated budget share fell below 15% to 13.8%. In 2009, allocated budget 
share was 13.3%.109  (Table 6)  The pattern of naval budget allocation last years of the 
aught decade began to resemble historic patterns. It should be noted that the budget share 
conversation is within the context of a larger total defense spending. For example, the 
dollar value of Indian military spending in 2008 was $24.7 billion USD up from 
$11.4 billion in 1988.110  The Standing Committee on Defense in the Indian parliament 
(Lok Sabha) recommended in 2007 that the Ministry of Defense up the budget share for 
the navy to 30%.111  That call fell on deaf ears. The assumption that naval spending 
would continue to increase is a key prerequisite for the construction and maintenance of a 
blue water navy. The commitment of the national security elite to this goal at this point is 
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It is clear from examining the activities of the Indian navy since the turn of the 
century that the Indian national security elite has chosen the option of implementing a 
blue water naval strategy. This strategy has been codified in doctrine and naval 
construction plans lock the Indian security establishment into at least a partial realization 
of the strategy. Having a navy that is able to project power far from home has gained to 
support of the security establishment and is viewed as India’s best bet to blunt Chinese 







IV. STRING OF PEARLS ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS, MILITARY FEASIBILITY AND THREAT 
PERCEPTION 
In this chapter, evidence will be presented that Chinese economic assistance to 
develop ports in the Indian Ocean littoral was a manifestation of China’s soft power 
strategy. Since the turn of the century, China has utilized its extensive foreign currency 
reserves to extend assistance to nations for infrastructure and other investments. This aid 
is a way for China to establish and maintain friendly relations with states in order to gain 
access to resources such as oil, natural gas, minerals or to gain access to markets. The 
nature of Chinese assistance to Indian Ocean littorals falls is to enable access to key 
strategic transportation nodes. There is little evidence that indicates that these 
relationships had any military component. These relationships will be examined in detail 
in what follows. In addition, the feasibility of establishing and maintaining Chinese naval 
bases will be explored. It may appear to the Indian security establishment that Chinese 
plans to establish a network of naval bases in the NIOA is a stroke of genius; I make the 
case that it would be a high order debacle, thereby lessening the chance that it is an 
option that was seriously considered by the Chinese. Lastly, the idea that Chinese 
presence in the Indian Ocean amounts to a strategic or operational threat will be tested. 
A. STRING OF PEARLS–CHINESE ENGAGEMENT BY COUNTRY 
1. Pakistan: 
From an economic perspective, the Gwadar port project is only as good as the 
infrastructure that connects it to markets within Pakistan and throughout the region. 
China pledged to not only fund the port’s construction, but also to assist in building road, 
rail and pipeline links. Specifically, China envisioned an infrastructure corridor that 
would link Gwadar to Kashi in Xinjiang Province through the Karakoram Pass.113  Such 
a link would allow the Chinese to bypass the northern Indian Ocean and shunt oil directly 
into China over land. Despite the attractiveness of the Gwadar-Kashi pipeline, the project 
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is in indefinite limbo due, in part, to the unstable internal security situation within 
Pakistan and to the technical challenges associated with routing a pipeline over the 
Himalayas.114  China has also contributed $200 million USD to the construction of the 
Gwadar-Karachi highway.115   
The Gwadar project is designed to diversify Pakistan’s port infrastructure and 
provide an output for the natural resources contained in Balochistan and Central Asia at 
large. Gwadar is strategically located only 240 miles from the Straits of Hormuz. When 
complete the Gwadar port would be made up of 3 berths, an approach channel, turning 
basin and other supporting infrastructure. The Chinese have contributed vast sums to 
finance the Gwadar project.116  Out of the $240 million required for Phase I of the 
project, the Chinese have financed $198 million.117  In addition to financial assistance, 
the Chinese Harbor and Engineering Company has been the primary contractor providing 
construction, engineering and other technical support for the project.118  Construction for 
Phase I began in 2002 and was completed in 2005.   Construction of Phase II started in 
2007 and is currently ongoing. Phase II will expand the port with the addition of 9 berths; 
4 container berths and various terminals to handle bulk cargo, grain and oil. The 
estimated cost for Phase II is $840 million USD.119  In 2007, the Government of Pakistan 
awarded PSA International, a Singaporean port operations firm, a 40 year contract to 
develop and manage the port.120   
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Chinese motives for backing the construction of Gwadar have been questioned by 
Indian security elite from the beginning. That China would provide such significant 
financial backing to a regional port project was viewed as a quid pro quo with Pakistan 
for future military use. Rumors of China being granted ‘sovereign rights’ to unimpeded 
access to the port, up to including military use, gained a great deal of traction within 
Indian and some Western security circles.121 
2. Sri Lanka 
The Hambantota Port is located on the southern end of Sri Lanka, approximately 
6 nm from the major Indian Ocean east-west shipping route.122  When complete, the port 
will consist of a harbor, cargo terminals, repair, bunkering and refueling facilities.123  The 
total cost of the project is estimated to be $1.4 billion USD.124  Phase I of the 
Hambantota port project cost approximately $360 million USD, 85% of which is funded 
by China. Construction of Phase I began in January, 2008 and was conducted by the 
China Harbor Engineering Company and Sino Hydro Corporation.125  Phase I was 
completed in 2010. In 2012, China committed to provide $600 million USD to finance 
Phase II of the port project.126  China Harbor Engineering Company has been awarded 
the contract for construction of Phase II.   
The Sri Lankan government has not granted basing rights to China; the facilities 
being constructed at Hambantota are for civilian use. 
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3. Bangladesh 
Chinese overtures to Bangladesh regarding access to port facilities and other 
transit infrastructure began in earnest after the turn of the century. Bangladesh has long 
enjoyed a close relationship with China. Over the years, China has provided Bangladesh 
with military hardware, economic assistance and technical support.127  Chinese harbors 
ambitions to tie Bangladesh into the network of port, pipeline and road links that feed 
resources into the Asian giant. Indian elite concern is centered on Chinese funds allocated 
to upgrade the Chittagong port facility and to link it by road to Yunan province in China 
via Mynamar.128  Rumors of Chinese designs on Chittagong have been in circulation 
since the 1990s.129  The oft cited Energy Futures in Asia report noted that China sought 
access to certain facilities at Chittagong in the early 2000s.130  Bangladesh currently has a 
naval base in the vicinity of Chittagong. Hydrography is a challenge at Chittagong; a long 
series of riverine channels must be negotiated to approach the port.131   In 2010, 
Bangladesh struck a deal with China to finance a highway between Chittagong and 
Kuming, China via Mynamar.132  In addition, China is providing funds to construct a 
deep sea port at Sondia.133  Bangladesh is currently negotiating transit agreements with 
Nepal, Bhuthan and India to utilize Chittagong as a regional hub.134   
4. Myanmar 
China is reported to have been involved in the development of various ports and 
to have been granted rights to use naval and airport facilities on various islands as well as 
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along the coast.135  As early as 1991, naval facilities at Hianggyi and Akyab have been 
the subject of speculation as to the nature of Chinese involvement.136  Most disturbing for 
Indian observers, the Chinese reportedly constructed a listening post on Great Coco 
island, a mere xx kilometers from the northernmost island in the Andaman and Nicobar 
chain. Sightings of Chinese military personnel on various Mynanmarese islands were 
rampant throughout the 1990s.137  Many observers viewed Myanmar’s position as 
geostrategic; an ocean outlet through Myanmar would allow resources (oil in particular) 
to flow into China without passing through the vulnerable waters of the Malacca Strait. 
The notion that China sought to build and expand port facilities in Myanmar gained the 
attention of Indian strategists.138  The port at Sitwe is seen as an object of Chinese desire 
both as an input into Yunan province, but also as potential naval base. The Chinese are 
funding road links from Sitwe to Yunan province.139  In addition, a project to build an oil 
pipeline from Sitwe to Yunan has also been initiated.140  Since its inception in 1988, the 
Myanmar military regime has received significant economic and military support from 
China. Ironically, in 2008 India won the bid to upgrade port facilities at Sitwe for $800 
million USD.141 
5. Maldives 
Reports in the Indian media indicated that discussions were held between China 
and the Maldives for naval basing rights. It was rumored in 1999 that the Chinese 
planned to build a submarine base on one of the outlying Maldivian islands. Chinese 
premier Zhu Rongji’s visit in 2001 fuelled concern in India that a deal for China to 
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commit to a long term lease for a naval base was eminent.142  In November, 2011 China 
opened a full embassy in the Maldivian capital, Male. It has offered economic aid in the 
form of infrastructure development. During the past decade, China assisted in building 
the Maldivian foreign ministry building in and has enabled cultural exchange. 143  There 
have been no agreements put forth to build Chinese military facilities on Maldivian 
territory 
B. STRING OF PEARLS–ANALYSIS OF MILITARY FEASIBILITY 
Maintenance of a network of naval bases in the Indian Ocean would require a 
significant military commitment on the part of China. To counter the threat of from 
Indian airstrikes and missiles pearl naval facilities would have to be hardened in addition 
to active countermeasures such as extensive antiaircraft defense systems.144  China would 
have to deploy a non-trivial number of surface combatants not to be overwhelmingly 
overmatched by India’s navy.145 
The potential ‘pearl’ naval bases at Gwadar, Chittagong, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and 
the Maldives fall well within the range fans of the Agni III ballistic missile (Figure 6). 
With a ranges of 350 and 300 km respectively, the Privthi III ship to surface ballistic 
missile and the BrahMos PJ-10 cruise missile could effectively target ‘pearl’ bases from 
the sea.146 
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Figure 6.  AGNI Missile Range Fans147 
 In addition to the threat posed by missile, air and naval assets several ‘pearl’ 
bases could be harried by the Indian army. The potential ‘pearl’ bases in Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar could be successfully overran by the Indian army during a 
conflict. Indian army operations against Pakistan during the 1971 war provide a case 
study of the way that a decisive ground campaign launched from India can take large 
swathes of Bangladeshi territory in a relatively short amount of time. During a war the 
Indian army would not just be able to attack Chinese naval bases uncontested; the PLA 
attacking from the Himalayas along a variety of fronts along with the Pakistani army in 
the west and Kashmir would tie up a considerable amount of Indian combat power. 
Gwadar would be a likelier candidate to withstand an Indian offense due to its location 
deep within Pakistani territory. Additionally, the cohesion of Pakistan territory is 
bolstered by the state’s nuclear backstop. It is unreasonable to assume, however, that 
during a two front war between against Pakistan and China any Chinese base in Pakistan 
would not be included on the nuclear strike list.   
Chinese naval bases in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka would be 
within the reach of land based air attack from Indian territory (Figure 7). Indian Mirage 
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fighters based on the subcontinent could strike Hambantota, Gwadar and Chittagong 
bombers based in the Andaman islands imperil bases in Mynamar (Figure 8). Observers 
have noted that the geography of Gwadar makes it particularly vulnerable to airstrikes.   
Gwadar port is connected to the mainland by a thin peninsula that could be targeted 
during a bombing campaign in addition to port facilities. Indian territory would be the 
proverbial ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ from which the Indians could imperil the viability 
of Chinese naval bases. 
 
Figure 7.  Indian Air Bases148 
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Figure 8.  Indian Air Force Range149 
Not unlike any military component, the effectiveness of naval power is greatly 
reduced if naval bases are within range of an adversary’s air or missile forces. During 
World War II, German surface naval combatants that were based in north Germany rarely 
left port due to British naval superiority and were constantly stymied along the docks by 
Allied bombers. Pakistani surface combatants were forced back into Karachi harbor in 
the early hours of the 1971 war where they would remain for the duration of the conflict.   
Chinese submarines based out of any of the ‘pearls’ pose the most serious threat 
India. However, fixing the location of Chinese submarines by basing them at one of the 
‘pearls’ increase the likelihood that they could be successfully tracked by the Indian 
military. Any Chinese submarine leaving a ‘pearl’ base could be surveilled and tracked 
by Indian assets. Chinese fast attack nuclear submarines operating from the western 
Pacific could conceivably have a greater impact in the Indian Ocean because their 
departure, route and location would be more difficult to track than submarines that 
operate from one of the ‘pearl’ bases. 
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C. THREAT PERCEPTION ANALYSIS–CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE 
NIOA 
The preceding examination of the actual activities that the Chinese have engaged 
in throughout the NIOA show that the String of Pearls are primarily economic in nature. 
It cannot be discounted, however, that these activities were viewed with suspicion by the 
Indian security elite. Moreover, the activities originating from a strategic rival may have 
been perceived as a long term threat. In order to evaluate this possibility, the factors that 
work together to cause a set of events or actions taken by another state to be classified as 
threatening by observers must be examined. Scholars who have written about the nature 
of strategic threat have posited several factors that describe when a series of events will 
trigger negative threat perception. In what follows, I have synthesized eight factors from 
the literature to examine if the String of Pearls can be reasonably perceived as a threat by 
the Indian security elite. These factors are Geography, Atmosphere of Tension, 
Observer’s Sense of Vulnerability, Presence of Democratic Norms in International 
Relations, Meaning of History, Violation of Rules, Offensive Capability, Offensive 
Intent.150 
1. Geography 
The hyperbolic commentary on the String of Pearls would lead one to believe that 
construction of Chinese naval bases in the NIOA was well underway. However, as it was 
shown in the last section, there are no Chinese naval bases being built, and none of the 
nations thought to be potential pearls has shown a serious inclination to take such a step. 
The PLA(N) ships pass through the NIOA making port calls, and have on one occasion, 
conducted a training exercise with Pakistan. The intelligence, reconnaissance and 
surveillance (ISR) activities conducted by Chinese submarines cannot be accurately 
gauged however, this activity is not unusual due to the fact that nations collect 
information on each other, even allies. It is clear that Chinese naval activity is transitory 
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and can easily fall within the right of nations to use the seas a means of transit. The 
proximate threat to India posed by China still rests with the PLA divisions that sit across 
the northern border. 
2. Atmosphere of Tension 
India and China have shared a militarized land border since the end of the 
1962 Sino-Indian War. Policymakers in both India and China have rhetorically upheld 
the notion that the two powers are rising peacefully together and do not harbor a desire to 
impose their will militarily upon one another. With the exception of a brief period of 
diplomatic contention following India’s nuclear tests in 1998, there has not been a major 
political or military crisis between China and India for more than two decades. This 
bump in the otherwise steady state of Sino-Indian relations since 1990 is important in the 
context that this period is the time where naval strategy was being evaluated. While the 
row over Vajpayee letter was not a naval issue, any degradation in the overall Sino-
Indian relationship could have contributed to an atmosphere of tension and impacted 
policymaker’s negative threat perception of China. 
On the maritime front, unlike in the contested waters surrounding the Senkaku 
Islands or in the Taiwan Straits or South China Sea, the Indian and Chinese navies have 
not been deployed as a means to gain leverage over a mutual territorial claim. The 
PLA(N) conducted amphibious assault exercises on islands in the Taiwan Strait in 1995. 
In addition, Chinese naval vessels regularly patrol and assist in maintaining facilities on 
various coral islands in the South China Sea to bolster its claims over an extensive 
Exclusive Economic Zone in the region. These sort of naval operations have often set the 
stage for face offs between the Chinese navy and the Japanese, Taiwanese, Philippine and 
Indonesian navies and others in Southeast Asia. India and China do not have any 
contested maritime boundaries or territories. The row over Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 
letter naming China as India’s main threat did not create a crisis that saw a break in 
diplomatic relations or a major change in military posture on the border.   
In fact, there was significant progress made in the 1990s and early 21st century to 
alleviate the issues surrounding the border dispute. A series of military confidence 
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building measures along the border in the 1990s culminated in an agreement in 2002 to 
establish a updated framework for border negotiations. At the turn of the century, the 
contours of the border dispute tilted toward cooperation and away from tension. Overall, 
despite the realities of their militarized land border, there was not an overall atmosphere 
of tension that would not have been a factor that contributed significantly to 
policymakers threat perception 
3. Observer’s Sense of Vulnerability 
The Chinese navy at the turn of the century did not have the ability to project 
power into the Indian Ocean or conduct sustained maritime operations far from its shores. 
From a purely maritime perspective, Chinese naval power was not a clear and present 
danger to the Indian navy. In a general sense, scholars have noted that Indian 
policymakers have viewed China’s rise with a degree of unease. Gardner catalogued the 
asymmetric perception that Indian policymakers hold regarding the Sino-Indian security 
relationship.151  Indian military and security documents and journals are more likely to 
cite China as a significant security challenge than those generated in China. From a 
military perspective, China’s modernization has outpaced India’s by a significant margin. 
On average, Chinese annual military spending has been 1.6 times that of India on average 
since 1990.152  The Chinese military is more than 2.25 million compared to India’s 1.32 
million. The Chinese navy is 255,000 strong compared to Indian naval strength of 
53,000.153  There is concern in New Delhi about the security implications of China’s rise. 
China’s average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth since 1980 has been 
approximately 10%154 per year; China’s GDP in 2011 was $7.3 trillion USD,   India’s 
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GDP in 2011 was $1.8 trillion USD.155  The Indian economy has not been able to 
generate the revenue required to match Chinese military spending potential. 
4. Presence of Democratic Norms in International Relations  
Farnham has posited that adherence to democratic norms play a role in the threat 
perception calculations of elites in democratic states when evaluating the actions taken by 
non-democratic states. Security elites in democratic states view violation of process 
norms such as negotiation as potentially threatening signals.156 Violation of conflict 
resolution norms by non-democratic states portend ill intent by convincing elites that 
non-democratic states would rather solve geopolitical disputes through military force or 
coercion. In the case of China and India the role of democratic norms may factor into 
Indian threat perception. The secretive decision making process employed by the ruling 
Chinese Communist Party make discerning intent behind long term naval strategy a 
challenge for outsiders. With respect to conflict resolution, Chinese actions to gain 
leverage over other states involved in maritime boundary disputes show a willingness to 
employ naval power to further its aims. While not the dominant dynamic driving Sino-
Indian relations, China’s  to not adhere to international relations norms that are valued by 
democratic states contribute to negative threat perception by Indian security elites.  
5. Meaning of History  
The lessons learned from history shape decision makers ability to process current 
events and categorize actions as threatening or non-threatening.157  It was previously 
mentioned that China once possessed the naval power to dominate the waters of the 
western Pacific, but also those of South Asia. In this context, Chinese naval 
modernization and growth would have been viewed by Indian security elites as a 
precursor for reestablishing a tributary system between China and the littoral nations of 
Asia. In addition, India policymakers have not forgotten that European colonialism was 
imposed upon India from the sea by maritime powers Portugal and Great Britain. This 
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history makes Indian elites sensitive to an asymmetric growth of naval power in the 
Indian Ocean led by extra regional powers. Colonial European navies were able to brush 
aside antiquated, disorganized Indian naval forces in the 17th century thereby enabling 
the subsequent subjugation of the subcontinent. These experiences serve as a factor in 
Indian sensitivity to increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region by extra 
regional powers and factor into threat perceptions. 
6. Violation of Rules 
A state’s willingness to violate international rules is cited by Cohen as one of the 
strongest preconditions to being perceived as a potential threat by others in the 
international system. Cohen defines rules broadly to include: international law, 
international agreements, bi-lateral pacts, spheres of influences and unwritten or tacit 
agreements.158  In the case of maritime threat perception, I argued in a previous chapter 
that India views the Northern Indian Ocean Area as a sphere of influence. The notion that 
regional powers designate areas on their periphery to serve as security buffer zones or 
places to exercise primary political influence is not new; Cohen characterizes spheres of 
influence as part of what make up unwritten rules that states will take action to uphold. 
Violation of a state’s unwritten rules can be characterized as a threat. As I have noted 
earlier, the location of the possible ‘pearl’ bases fall squarely within the area in which 
India considers its sphere of maritime influence. The establishment of Chinese naval 
bases in the NIOA would be a violation of India’s sphere of influence. Cohen argues that 
rules violations are the primary determinant of threatening intent. 
7. Offensive Capability 
China has been modernizing its military since the early 1990s. At the turn of the 
century a comparison of Chinese to Indian destroyer and frigate numbers illustrate a part 
of the overall ‘ship gap’ between the two countries. In the year 2000, the PLA(N) had 
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45 destroyers and frigates in service compared to India’s 19.159  China also possesses a 
submarine force that dwarfed India’s almost 4 to 1.160 India possessed an operational 
aircraft carrier at the turn of century while China did not. However, the size disparity of 
the surface combatant force places the naval offensive capability advantage at the turn of 
the century on the side of China. Additionally, Chinese naval modernization was 
projected to maintain the overall PLA(N) advantage over the Indian navy.161  The 
measure of offensive capability is probably the least useful dimension of threat 
assessment in this case given that at the turn of the century there were several navies that 
had an advantage in terms of offensive capability over India, including but not limited to 
the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Japan. No serious analyst at the turn of the century 
would have suggested that these navies posed a threat to India. The more telling measure 
of threat is offensive intent. Of course an adversary can harbor offensive intent, but if it 
does not have to capability to act on the threat, then intent is of no consequence.   
8. Offensive Intent 
The Chinese navy reformulated its naval doctrine in the mid-1980s. The former 
commander of the PLA(N), Admiral Liu Huaqing, is associated with a the ‘offshore 
defense’ naval doctrine and a development plan that would upgrade the Chinese navy to 
blue water status by 2040.162  Reports attributed to the Chinese Central Military 
Commission’s General Logistics Department called for increased naval visits to the 
Indian Ocean.163  It is clear from these sources that Chinese intended to increase the size 
and reach of its navy in the 21st century. However, there is little to suggest that Chinese 
naval modernization is focused on neutralizing India or controlling the Indian Ocean. 
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China has never stated a desire to construct a global network of military bases nor has it 
ever based  military forces in foreign lands.164  The Chinese navy capabilities are tailored 
to counter a navy such as the U.S. navy which relies on aircraft carriers and other surface 
vessels to project power.165  Chinese naval activity and strategy is focused on dealing 
with challenges in the western Pacific.166  Specifically, China is dealing with several 
maritime territorial disputes such as claims over Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands and its 
claim on an extensive EEZ in the South China Sea. Concern over Indian Ocean SLOCs is 
on China’s agenda, however, from a military standpoint these concerns rank below 
western Pacific issues. China has never expressed a definite intent to conduct or prepare 
to conduct offensive operations in the Indian Ocean or its littorals. The idea that China’s 
strategic relationship with Pakistan would bring it into a shooting war on with Pakistan 
against India is not supported by history. China did not intervene military to assist 
Pakistan in any of the three wars that it fought against India after it established a strategic 
partnership with China in the early 1960s. The strategic environment has not changed to 
suggest that China would intervene in a future Indian-Pakistan conflict. Even if such an 
intervention were to happen it would more likely occur by land into contested territory 
adjacent to the Himalayas.   
An analysis of factors that determine threat perception would suggest that the 
INSE may have considered the String of Pearls phenomenon as a threat. The Observer’s 
Sense of Vulnerability, Meaning of History, Violation of Rules and Offensive Capability 
would have been the primary drivers of threat perception.   Scholars have theorized about 
the link between events at the international level (such as a military threat) and the 
resulting adaptation of military doctrine. Others have argued that civil military relations 
and the structure of military institutions will determine the doctrinal response to changes 
in the international system. The commonality between these theories rests in the role that 
civilian leadership plays in doctrine development. Cohen suggests that international 
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crises focuses the minds of the civilian leadership and that military leaders will present 
solutions to the in the form of new doctrine to get in step with leadership or because of 
pressure from leadership.   argues that doctrinal change in response to an international 
crisis depends instead on the nature of the military institution and the command 
relationship between civilian and military. Both scholars agree that it is impossible to 
predetermine the type of doctrine that will result; Cohen suggests that there is a bias 
toward the drafting of offensive doctrine.167 
9. Indian Threat Perception Outcome and Impact 
A geostrategic threat will cause states to change strategic course possibly altering 
military doctrine. It is unclear, however what military avenues states will pursue to 
counter a threat. Will they respond with offensive or defensive doctrine?  Will they 
innovate or attempt to optimize existing doctrine? . For example, after World War II the 
Soviet Union faced a maritime threat from the U.S. navy. The U.S. navy was a blue water 
force organized around the aircraft carrier task force. An analyst in 1950 would be hard 
pressed to predict which naval strategy and doctrine the Soviets would adopt relying only 
on Soviet threat perception verification. Prior to World War I, the security elite around 
the world were influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings and supported the 
construction of blue water navies. Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan all 
invested significant resources into naval development and construction in the years 
leading up to World War I. Each navy posed a threat to the others, however states 
responded in basically the same way; by building a bigger stronger blue water navy. 
Knowledge of threat does not allow one to predict the military response of other actors in 
the system. 
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If the String of Pearls is perceived to be a maritime threat, then is it a given that a 
blue water naval strategy would be adopted as a counter?  What about an anti-access, area 
denial strategy?  Is it possible that power would be shifted to the Indian air force to 
develop long range bombing capability to reduce possible pearl bases?  Of the four naval 
strategy options that were being considered by naval leadership at the turn of the century, 
how would knowing Indian threat perceptions assist in predicting which option would be 
selected?  Verification of Indian elite threat perceptions alone is not sufficient to deduce 
why a blue water naval doctrine was adopted over other alternatives   
D. CONCLUSION 
Evidence was presented in this chapter to show that the “String of Pearls” is 
primarily a scheme to increase Chinese influence in south Asia through the financing of 
infrastructure projects. The “String of Pearls” is not a Chinese military expansion project. 
From a military standpoint, Chinese naval bases located  so close to India would require a 
significant commitment to maintain and would be highly vulnerable to attack and 
isolation. These facts support the notion that Indian unease about the nature of Chinese 
activities in the NIOA is not entirely rational. While there is evidence to suggest that the 
INSE would have viewed Chinese activity in the NIOA as a threat, these facts do not lead 
to a clear understanding about the development of a blue water naval doctrine as a 
response. If the Chinese activity is modeled as a loss of influence rather than a threat, 
Prospect Theory provides a means to explain why the security establishment embraced a 
blue water doctrine. 
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V. PROSPECT THEORY ANALYSIS OF INDIAN NAVAL 
STRATEGY 
Prospect Theory provides a model to explain not only why the ‘String of Pearls’ 
phenomenon would spark a reaction in the INSE but also would allow an analyst to 
reasonably predict a military doctrinal response if the strategic options under 
consideration are known. Unlike threat analysis, Prospect Theory provides a clearer link 
between a change in the geostrategic environment and the policies that states implement 
to adapt. Information will be presented in this chapter will illuminate how the INSE 
through the mechanism of a shared reference point collectively viewed Chinese presence 
in the NIOA as a loss and were thereby more willing to endorse the growth of the Indian 
navy and the adoption of a blue water naval doctrine as countermeasures. The blue water 
doctrine was the riskiest choice out of a set of four alternative strategies. The INSE 
sought to reestablish the status quo of Indian maritime dominance of the NIOA through 
implementation of the Indian Maritime Doctrine. As I have shown in Chapter IV, Indian 
maritime dominance in the NIOA has never been seriously challenged by Chinese 
activity. Applying Prospect Theory to this problem explains INSE misperception of 
Chinese intent as well as the resulting policy outcome. 
A. PROSPECT THEORY 
One of the main hypotheses that arise from Prospect Theory is that people are 
willing to take risks in order to reestablish a recently lost position. Correspondingly, 
people tend to be more sensitive to losses than to gains. The frame of reference (“status 
quo”) that people seek to maintain will be guarded and any change in position from the 
status quo that is considered a loss will be met with efforts to regain lost ground. 
Each option in a choice set evaluated under expected utility can be expressed 
mathematically as: EV = p * u where EV is the expected value, u is the subjective utility 
of the option and p is the probability of occurrence. Prospect theory is described 
algebraically  as V = w(p)*v(x).168   In this relationship V is the value of a prospect, v(x) 
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is the value function and w(p) is the probability weighting function.169  Each value for p 
corresponds to an outcome value x. The value function describes what has experimentally 
been shown to be the salient features of Prospect Theory. Namely, the value function 
describes how people code utility not in absolute terms but as positive or negative in 
relation to a reference point. The value function curve is convex in the negative “losses” 
region and concave in the positive “gains” region. The “S” shape of the curve describes 
experimental findings. In the domain of losses, utility decreases at an increasing rate and 
increases at a decreasing rate in the domain of gains (Figure 9). People express an 
aversion to losses while cautiously pursuing additional gains. The value function is also 
produces results which are steeper for losses than for gains.170  Losses hurt worse from a 
psychological standpoint than gains feel good.     
 
 
Figure 9.  Prospect Value Graph (From Jervis, 1992) 
Additionally, the probability function w(p) is also non-linear and has a larger 
variance near probability values of 0 and 1. The probability weighting function is an 
expression of the tendency for people to underweight medium to high probabilities and 
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overweight low probabilities.171  That is, the probability that an option under 
consideration will cause greater losses will be discounted even if the probability of the 
option failing is high.172  It is notable that probabilities approaching certainty (p=1) cause 
Prospect Theory to produce outcomes that are identical to those produced under expected 
utility.173   
An illustration of these phenomena can be seen in the results of experiments 
conducted by Kahneman & Tversky. Eighty percent of survey respondents preferred to 
have a guaranteed $3000 to an 80% chance of gaining $4000 dollars. In this example, the 
status quo position of possessing $3000 is the preferred choice of respondents despite the 
potential for gains. In a second experiment, 92% of respondents would risk an 
80% chance of losing $4000 dollars and a 20% chance of losing nothing instead of taking 
a guaranteed loss of $3000. This case illustrates the propensity of individuals to risk a 
greater loss in the face of a guaranteed smaller loss.   
An example of applying Prospect Theory to explain international conflict was is 
the case of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Egyptians attacked Israel to regain territory 
lost in the Sinai Peninsula in 1967. The loss of the Sinai was viewed as wholly 
unacceptable by Egyptian elites resulting in a risky strategy to conduct military 
operations against a militarily superior Israel that had decisively defeated Arab armies in 
1956 and 67.174 
In this study, the crisis examined is Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, the 
independent variable is domain and the dependent variable is risk propensity.175  The  
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critical steps of analysis are establishing a reference point and domain.176  The focus of 
analysis is the decision making process and how the outcome was shaped by the editing 
of strategy options. 
The utilization of Prospect Theory to explain the change in post 20th century 
naval strategy requires the identification of a reference point that is shared by the elite. 
This point will then be used to illustrate the perception of losses that result from growing 
Chinese presence in the NIOA.     
B. INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE REFERENCE POINT 
The attitude of INSE toward India’s role in South Asia is encapsulated in a quote 
from recent report written by several prominent INSE. To the INSE in South Asia: “India 
is the major power in the region.”177  This viewpoint has been derived from several 
streams of Indian history and politics. In what follows I will establish that the INSE 
reference point is Indian economic, political and military dominance in South Asia. 
Jawaharlal Nehru has arguably had the greatest impact on modern Indian security 
thought. As the first Prime Minister of the independent Republic of India Nehru 
possessed an enormous amount of political capital and was able to fundamentally shape 
Indian foreign policy and security institutions. His 18-year tenure as Prime Minister 
afforded Nehru the opportunity to impress his notions of the role of India in South Asia 
unto the Indian national security community. Nehru was a sophisticated figure who had 
extensive knowledge of and interest in history and foreign affairs.   Nehru began to shape 
the foreign policy of India prior to independence.178  The idea that India is a special state 
whose role in charting the course of South Asian peoples permeates Nehru’s writings and 
policies. Nehru believed that India’s role in South Asia is exclusive and historic. In 
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addition to shaping the view of the INSE in general, Nehru was instrumental in setting 
the foreign policy positions of the Indian National Congress Party.   
One of Nehru’s bedrock beliefs was that the Indian civilization encompassed the 
entire subcontinent and that the Republic of India was the legitimate inheritor of Indian 
culture and history.  
The diversity of India is tremendous; it is obvious; it lies on the surface 
and anybody can see it. It concerns itself with the physical appearance as 
well as certain attitudes and traits. There is little in common, outward 
seeming, between the Pathan in the North-West and the Tamil in the far 
South. Their racial stocks are not the same even though there may be 
common strands running through them; they differ in face and figure, food 
and clothing, and of course, language. In the North West there is already 
the breath of Central Asia and many a custom there, as in Kashmir, 
reminds one of the countries on the other side of the Himalayas. Pathan 
popular dances are singularly like Russian Cossack dancing. Yet, with all 
these differences, there is no mistaking the impress of India on the Pathan 
as this is obvious on the Tamil.179 
The partition of the British Raj into India and Pakistan was viewed by Nehru as a 
political expediency to hasten the departure of the British. Nehru viewed India’s right to 
determine the political destiny of the subcontinent as being unaffected by partition.180   
In addition his historic views, Nehru sought to place India at the center of various 
international organizations and movements. While some of these efforts were not 
exclusively focused on South Asia, they illustrate Nehru’s view of India as a regional 
power. In 1947, Nehru initiated the Asian Federation, an organization that was comprised 
of nations that bordered the Indian Ocean.181   During the 1950s, Nehru crafted the non-
alignment strategy in which he advocated foreign policy course that did not place India 
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strategy morphed into an international movement in the early 1960s as leaders of other 
states (mainly former European colonies) embraced non-alignment as a feasible foreign 
policy. 182 
Himalayan states such as Nepal, Sikkim183 and Bhutan were seen as frontier 
buffer regions useful mainly for placing distance between China and India. Nehru 
considered these states as nominally independent whose autonomy extended mostly to 
internal affairs. The execution foreign policy and defense for these states was to be the 
India’s responsibility as regional power. In the case of Nepal, India wielded significant 
influence over its foreign affairs throughout the 1950s. In 1960, India deployed troops 
along the Nepalese border with China in response to a Chinese border incursion. As a 
result of this hegemonic behavior, Nepal began to assert its sovereignty over foreign 
polices and distance itself from India beginning in the 1960s.184   Even though the level 
of influence India has over the Himalayan states has waned somewhat since Nehru’s 
time, the perception that India a significant voice in the foreign affairs of these nations 
has remained in the INSE.    
After the brief interregnum Prime Ministerships of Gulzarilal Nanda and Lal 
Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi rose to lead the Indian government. Her tenure as Prime 
Minster was also significant in cementing the view amongst the INSE that India is the 
natural hegemon in South Asia. With the exception of a three-year period from 1977–
1980, Gandhi’s term spanned 15 years. Gandhi reaffirmed Nehru’s non-alignment stance 
with an emphasis on India’s strategic flexibility: “The principles which have guided our 
foreign policy are in keeping with the best traditions of our country, and are wholly 
consistent with our national interest, honor and dignity. They continue to remain 
valid.”185  
Her policies toward other South Asian nations were a manifestation of Gandhi’s 
perception of India as South Asia’s preeminent regional power. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan 
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War simultaneously humbled Pakistan and gave birth to Bangladesh. The small 
Himalayan state of Sikkim voted to join India following an Indian military intervention to 
support the ruling regime.    
As an alternative to the Nehru-Gandhi foreign policy school, the Hindu 
nationalists were able to influence Indian strategy beginning in the 1980s. Despite 
significant differences on domestic policies, Hindu nationalists and Congress Party 
politicians share the view that India is and should be the dominant power in South Asia. 
To Hindu nationalists, Bharatmata (Divine Mother India) is a land that includes the whole 
subcontinent (Figure 10).186  The logo of the flagship Hindu nationalist organization, 
Rashtriya Sayamsevak Sangh depicts this viewpoint: 
 
Figure 10.  Mother India187  
In his influential book, Hindutva, Hindu nationalist scion, V.D. Sarvarkar wrote: 
At last the great mission which the Sindhus had undertaken of founding a 
nation and a country, found and reached its geographical limit when the 
valorous Prince of Ayodhya made a triumphant entry in Ceylon and 
actually brought the whole land from the Himalayas to the Seas under one 
sovereign sway.188 
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Hindu nationalist influence on Indian politics grew steadily throughout the 1980s 
and culminated in the formation of governments led by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
beginning in late 1990s.    
The INSE have a shared view that India South Asia’s regional power and that all 
strategic gains or losses are viewed from this reference point. 
C. THE INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE IN THE DOMAIN OF 
LOSSES 
China’s engagement in South Asia during the 21st century has been perceived as 
threatening by the INSE. Chinese economic and military aid to South Asian states has 
been viewed by the INSE through a zero sum lens; Chinese gains in the region lead to 
Indian losses. A perceived decline from the INSE reference point of Indian dominance of 
South Asia would place the INSE into the psychological “domain of losses.”   
1. The Domain of Losses, the Media and Indian Think Tanks 
Since 2005, there have been 58 articles in major world newspapers that mention 
the “String of Pearls” strategy as it relates to China and India. The Indian Defense 
Review published 19 articles about the “String of Pearls” strategy since 2005. In addition 
to media outlets, major Indian think tanks such as the Center for Policy Research (CPR) 
and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) have written extensively on the implications 
of Chinese engagement in South Asia. From 2007 through 2011 there were 89 articles in 
IDA’s flagship journal Strategic Analysis that contained the phrase “String of Pearls 
Strategy.”   In 2012, CPR published Non-Alignment 2.0 as a working paper to inject 
energy into the Indian strategic dialog. The following quote from this document 
highlights how India “lagged behind” China in the contest for influence in South Asia: 
This situation has been further complicated by the fact that South Asia is a 
region where other great powers, particularly China, are trying to expand 
their influence...The only way to counter Chinese economic engagement is 
to have a credible engagement plan of our own. But most importantly 
India has lagged behind because of its inability to follow 
Professor Brahma Chellaney, a prominent CPR analyst, succinctly summarized 
the dread  that the INSE feel when they consider the possibility of India being choked by 
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a “String of Pearls”: “What if India were to do what China is doing in its periphery—
develop a web of partnerships around it? How would China react? We need to be 
objective here.” 
What follows is a series of quotes from the INSE or other South Asian security 
figures which illustrate that 21st century Chinese engagement in South Asia has caused 
the INSE to believe that they are losing influence to China. 
a. The Domain of Losses Depicted 
Indian National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan characterized China’s 
growing South Asian influence in the following manner: 
For India, China’s inroads into countries on its periphery are 
disconcerting, to say the least..... China has developed key interests in Sri 
Lanka, including helping Sri Lanka to build a major port at 
Hambanatota..... China is actively wooing Nepal and the Maldives. It is 
extremely keen to establish a fraternal relationship with Bhutan.189 
Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Metha asserted that the Chinese 
funded Gwarder Port would have serious strategic implications for India.”190 
With respect to Chinese South Asian influence Admiral Metha stated that: 
“On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military 
gap and countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean Region.”191 
Former Indian Foreign Secretary and current National Security Advisor 
Shiv Shankar Menon characterized the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy as an “ineffective 
murder weapon.”  While dismissive of the notion that Chinese inroads into South Asia is 
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part of a plan to militarily isolate India, he inexplicitly acknowledges in that Chinese 
influence has vis a vis India has increased.192 
Defense Secretary A. K. Antony’s view on China’s growing influence in South Asia: 
Today, the security situation in our immediate neighborhood has become 
really complex,.. On the one hand, there are some political developments, 
and on the other hand, a number of other factors are a cause for worry and 
need to be factored into our preparations, both in the short term and long 
term.193  
2. Recognition of Lost Relative Indian Influence by South Asian Security 
Elite 
The security elite throughout South Asia recognize that their nations engagement 
with China could be perceived as a loss in influence by the Indians. The following quotes 
illustrate that foreign officials recognize that the Indians perceive they are losing 
influence to China. 
During a visit in 2009, Bangladeshi Chief of Army Staff General Mohammed 
Abdul Mubeen stated that Chinese engagement was “not strategic” and would not affect 
Bangladeshi-Indian ties.194 
Sri Lankan officials made a strenuous effort to assure a visiting Indian delegation 
that Chinese engagement would not lead damage India’s influence: 
We would certainly not allow one country to use Sri Lanka as a launching 
pad for hostile action against any other country. That is the universal 
principle and we accept that. There is no way that we will allow any 
country to use Sri Lankan soil or waters to take hostile action against any 
other country,....So there is no hostility or competition. Both are our 
                                                 








friends. There is no reason for fears or suspicions. These are commercial 
relations ...no question of China encircling195  
Maldivian Foreign Minister Ahmed Nassem bolsters Indian perceptions in the 
following manner: 
We have a simple solution on the India-China rivalry. We never do 
anything in secrecy. We keep the Indians informed of what we are 
planning with China before anyone tells them anything in private.196 
D. INDIAN NAVY STRATEGIC / DOCTRINAL OPTIONS 
Now that the reference point has been established for the INSE and evidence has 
been presented that their perception of Chinese presence places them in the domain of 
losses, it is now appropriate to detail the editing process for each strategic option.   
1. Option 1–Coastal Defense / Deterrent Navy 
The Indian navy began with coastal defense and deterrence as its main objective. 
The navy’s missions and objectives quickly grew beyond this role in the 1950s and 1960s 
as security competition with Pakistan increased197. The advent of the Indian coast guard 
has removed many of the missions that would be necessary for a coastal defense force 
from the navy’s portfolio. There is little evidence to suggest that this option was seriously 
considered by Indian policymakers.198 
2. Option 2–Sea Denial 
Sea denial is a naval strategy that is designed to counter the threat posed by navies 
that have an advantage in surface combatants and a doctrine that emphasizes sea 
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control.199  The objective of sea denial is to “deny control of the ocean to an 
opponent.”200  This strategy includes a global strike option through the employment of 
nuclear fast attack and ballistic missile submarines.201  Submarines are used conduct 
surveillance far from a nation’s home shores and to clandestinely track an adversary’s 
naval assets.202  During conflict, unrestricted submarine warfare would be launched 
against enemy surface vessels as well as merchant ships.203  Long range bombers would 
be used to patrol and interdict sea lines of communication. The employment of missile 
systems is also a key part of the sea denial strategy. A power employing this strategy 
would invest in significant amount of anti-ship missiles and employ them on strategic 
terrain within range of key chokepoints, approaches or transit routes.204   
The strategy is tailor made to counter extra-regional presence and power 
projection in the NOIA. Upon the advent of hostilities, hostile naval forces operating in 
the NOIA or attempting to enter it would have to penetrate several rings of defenses 
through considerable effort.   
In terms of gains, the adoption of a sea denial strategy would allow for India to 
continue to maintain an independent strategy that is not reliant on the participation or 
sanction by other powers. The threat of an extra regional power intervening in a conflict 
in south Asia involving India is reduced; an U.S.S Enterprise style intervention would not 
be easily accomplished if the India navy employed sea denial. 
The potential losses that are attributed to adopting a sea denial strategy are 
considerable. Namely, the international community would have taken umbrage to a naval 
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power that sits astride one of the world’s major shipping arteries declaring that its 
primary naval strategy is one of sea denial. Asian powers that rely on this artery such as 
Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines and China would surely have viewed an Indian sea 
denial strategy with a great deal of concern. The U.S. (viewed by most powers as being 
responsible for keeping global shipping lanes open) would have been forced to respond to 
such an open challenge to the free flow of maritime traffic.   
The probability that a sea denial strategy will receive widespread support and 
promotion in the INSE is low. After the Enterprise incident, the Indian navy flirted with 
the idea of making sea denial the centerpiece of Indian naval strategy.205  The navy 
significantly upgraded its submarines during this period in addition to upgrading its 
nascent anti-submarine capability. This flirtation was short lived as institutional biases 
toward maintaining the surface warfare focused regional power strategy remained in the 
forefront. This tendency is evidenced by naval acquisition patterns during the 1980s. 
While purchases of systems that can be used to support a sea denial strategy were made, 
other important capabilities necessary to implement the strategy were not. For example, 
while the purchase of  HDW Type 1500, class-209 and Kilo submarines were made, 
significant investment in other systems such as anti-ship missiles, surveillance and sensor 
technology was not.206  On the other hand, significant capital was spent on equipment 
designed to implement the regional power strategy such as India’s second aircraft carrier.   
Both the low expected utility of gains combined with the potential for losses 
placed the sea denial strategy on similar footing to the minimum deterrent strategy as 
options that did not receive meaningful consideration as 21st century Indian naval 
strategy. 
                                                 
205 Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming India’s Military Modernization: 89. Cohen and Dasgupta’s 
contention is not supported by any documented changes to doctrine or strategy. There was a school of 
thought within the Indian navy that the ability of extra regional powers to intervene in waters close to India 
was a major problem that must be countered. 
206 Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power & Indian Security: 107–21. 
 74
3. Option 3–Regional Superiority (Green Water) 
Maintaining naval superiority over other NOIA littoral nations would be the main 
priority. This option was considered to be the status quo strategy by Indian naval 
leadership.207 
Upgrading existing platforms and replacing ships that have come to the end of 
their service life cycle through a combination of indigenization and foreign purchases 
would be a priority if the regional superiority strategy was extended. Under this scenario, 
the employment of an aircraft carrier would not be out of the question, however, the 
argument that more than one carrier is required to maintain regional superiority would 
have stood on shaky ground. In terms of surface combatants, a mix of destroyers, frigates, 
short range submarines and support vessels would be necessary to support the strategy. 
Interoperability with other navies would not be featured prominently under a continuation 
of the regional superiority strategy because it would not be a critical requirement.   
The benefits of this approach are its low cost; the indigenous aircraft carrier 
project, the Air Defense Ship (ADS) costs approximately $1.5 billion USD. In addition, 
the refurbished carrier Admiral Gorshkov that the Indian purchased from Russia costs 
upwards of $1.5 billion dollars. The suite of 45 MiG 29 fighters purchased to operate 
from India’s carriers cost $ 2.2 billion USD. In comparison, three new Shivalik class 
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Additional benefit also derives from the fact that the strategy did not represent a 
radical departure from the policies that the Indian navy implemented for the first 50 years 
of its existence.209  The littoral nations knew what to expect from the Indian navy, 
thereby contributing to stability. 
There were very few losses that could have been accrued by continuing the 
regional superiority strategy. The preceding chapter presented evidence to suggest that 
the Chinese naval buildup at the turn of the century would not be substantive threat in the 
NIOA for decades. The U.S. would still be the preeminent power in the world’s oceans 
and was not hostile toward India. The regional superiority naval strategy could have been 
continued. 
The probability that the regional superiority strategy would succeed are high. The 
national security priority has always been to ensure that it was the dominant player in 
south Asia. A navy that maintained its regional advantage would meet the minimum bar 
of acceptability of the Indian security establishment and would have been continuously 
supported. The regional superiority naval strategy advanced Indian interests for decades. 
The low cost of this strategy coupled with the surety of positive gains makes this strategy 
the option with the highest expected utility. In addition, the variance of outcomes was not 
substantial; the likely gains of staying the strategic course were moderate with a high 
probability of success coupled with relatively small losses.   
4. Option 4–Blue Water / International Coalition Navy 
The most ambitious option that was considered by the Indian national security 
elite was to turn India’s navy into a blue water force capable of sustained operations far 
from Indian shores.210  This navy would have the ability to conduct multiple missions 
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such as sea control, sea denial and amphibious operations.211  This version of the Indian 
navy would be built around aircraft carriers. Aircraft carrier task forces made up of 
destroyers, frigates, submarines and support ships would patrol not only the waters of 
NIOA, but venture further out to areas beyond the Straits of Hormuz and Straits of 
Malacca. An important aspect of this strategy is the capability to operate as a part of an 
international naval coalition. Interoperability with the U.S. navy is paramount due to the 
leading role that the U.S. plays in maintaining global maritime security.212  Adoption of 
this strategy would validate the idea that the Indian security elite view China’s increasing 
presence in the NIOA as irreversible and that India’s best chance to meet the maritime 
challenge posed by China would be with a large, multipurpose navy that would serve as a 
part of a larger coalition containing Chinese maritime ambitions. Relative navy 
superiority in south Asia would not be enough to check Chinese advances. 
The possible strategic advances gained by successfully implementing the blue 
water naval strategy are substantial. If the Indian were to build an advanced navy that was 
able to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean and play a value added role in 
missions abroad a part of a coalition and simultaneously stymied Chinese plans for naval 
bases and increased naval presence in the NOIA then the geostrategic benefit would be 
enormous.   
On the negative side of the ledger, developing a blue water naval strategy is the 
most expensive of all options. As noted above, the estimated cost of each aircraft carrier 
is around 1.5 billion USD.213 
In addition, employing high value assets such as aircraft carriers are increasing 
risky. The proliferation of anti-ship missiles and anti-access technologies such as 
submarines, remote sensing and surveillance and mines has the potential to limit the 
utility of carriers by increasing the distance that they can safely operate from contested 
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areas.214  For example, during the Falklands War, the British aircraft carrier HMS 
Hermes could not provide close air support to ground operations because of concern 
about Argentine anti-ship missiles. In that same conflict, the Argentine aircraft carrier 
Veinticinco de Mayo did not leave the harbor because of the threat posed by British 
submarines. A vigorous debate on the vulnerability of large carriers has been going on 
inside of the American naval community.215  Indian military officials have also 
recognized the weaknesses of a carrier centric navy given the evolution of anti-access, 
area denial technology.   
An Indian naval buildup would also run the risk of militarizing the NOIA as other 
littoral nations build naval forces to counter the Indians. 
Assessing the probabilities associated with the possible pros and cons of the blue 
water naval strategy require an examination of the assumptions that Indian naval 
policymakers were operating under as they deliberated on the course of action. According 
to Barnett, Indian naval policymakers assumed that a blue water naval strategy would be 
a viable option in the 21st century because: 1) the security competition between India and 
its continental rivals, Pakistan and China would decrease; 2) a “far” larger share of the 
defense budget would be allocated to the navy in the future (consistently above 15%). If 
adopted, successful implementation of the blue water naval strategy would hinge on these 
factors remaining true. As was previously noted, the navy’s share of the budget has never 
exceeded 15% and has often been relegated to single digits. The health of the military 
budget, and correspondingly, the naval budget depends on steady Indian economic 
growth. Indian GDP growth in the latter half of the 1990s at the beginning of the military 
buildup averaged 8% per year. The strong economic performance that has become part 
and parcel of the Indian economy since the reforms of the early 1990s must continue in 
order to ensure the continued growth of the Indian military. An underperforming Indian 
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economy could bring back the days of austere military budgets. In an environment of 
austerity, India the institutional advantage that the continent focused services have over 
budget prioritization would come to the fore at the expense of the navy. For a service that 
relies on long-term capital allocation in order to complete multiyear ship construction 
projects the realities of the budget will impact the effectiveness of the navy’s strategy and 
doctrine. 
The notion that the threat from Pakistan and China on the Indian subcontinent 
would abate during the first decades of the 21st century is highly debatable. At the turn of 
the century India and Pakistan faced off in the Kargil War over contested territory in 
Kashmir. The presence of Chinese divisions over the border in Tibet cannot be dismissed 
even though the military action associated with the border dispute has not flared since 
1986. To assume that militarized borders in with Pakistan and China will somehow 
dissipate over time without reasonable expectation that the issues of contention between 
India and Pakistan and China are resolved (territorial disputes in Kashmir and Arunachal 
Pradesh respectively) is risky. Crises can arise unexpectedly in along the border which 
can quickly escalate to armed conflict. The probability of a permanent shift in Indian 
defense priorities continuously allocate a significant amount of resources to the navy is 
unlikely.   
The blue water navy strategic option has both the highest variance in outcomes 
and a lower expected value than the regional superiority option. If successful, the strategy 
will achieve the goal of securing the NIOA in a spectacular way. China will be deterred 
from operating (through naval bases or patrolling) within the NIOA and India’s 
interoperability with international navies, the U.S. navy in particular, will enable it to 
play a critical role in a wide range of international maritime security operations. In 
addition, it would stand ready to ‘plug into’ an international naval operation directed 
against a regional adversary. However, if the strategy fails, it will do so spectacularly. 
The south Asian littoral region will be more militarized nations adopting an anti-access / 
area denial approach to challenge India’s carrier battle groups. Cost overruns coupled 
with India’s less than stellar reputation for bringing indigenous military technology to 
field on schedule could push deployment of the ships necessary to implement the strategy 
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beyond the time that the strategy will   Lastly, a large, blue water Indian navy could send 
a signal to China that if it wants to truly secure its lines of communication to the Middle 
East, it must significantly enhance its naval capabilities beyond the levels that it has 
planned.  The Indian naval establishment has recognized that it cannot match China’s 
level of naval spending in the long run. Former Indian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral 
Sureesh Mehta commented in 2009 that: “In military terms, both conventional and non-
conventional, we neither have the capability nor the intention to match China, force for 
force.”216  A commitment by China to force its way through the Indian Ocean by 
increasing the size of its navy beyond what it has planned to do already would 
overwhelm India and create a true strategic problem. 
For these reasons, the Blue Water navy option is both the riskiest option and 
simultaneously the choice with the lowest expected value. However, as predicted by 
Prospect Theory, it is the option that the INSE has embraced and is moving forward to 
implement. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The decision to shift decisively from a green water navy doctrine to a blue water 
doctrine can best be explained through Prospect Theory. The alternative of modeling 
India’s response to Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean as the rational response to a 
threat or a perceived threat has several deficiencies. I have presented evidence to suggest 
that the “String of Pearls” phenomenon is primarily economic in nature; it is the 
manifestation of Chinese strategy to expand its influence in south Asia through economic 
means. It was also shown that the many of the supposed sites for potential Chinese naval 
bases were militarily vulnerable and would require significant resources to maintain. For 
these reasons, I surmise that the String of Pearls poses no real military threat to India. On 
the other hand, there were several factors that may have contributed to the perception of 
threat in the minds of the INSE. Factors such as the Observer’s Sense of Vulnerability, 
Meaning of History, Violation of Rules, Offensive Capability and Offensive Intent all 
worked to create the specter of a threat that may not be grounded in reality. Even if threat 
were the driver of the INSE endorsement of the blue water naval doctrine, it remains 
unclear why this strategy rose above all others in terms of feasibility. If India’s green 
water naval force and doctrine served to protect its interest and to support success in war 
why would it so easily be abandoned?  The threat-response model provides little insight 
into the mechanics of elite decision making in the face of crisis. While one can surmise 
that a state will respond to a threat, there is no clear way to predict what the response will 
be.   
The application of Prospect Theory to the case of the Indian response to the String 
of Pearls provides several valuable insights. Namely, it allows an analyst to project the 
response of a state or state organization to a crisis if that event is viewed as a loss by 
policymakers. I have shown that the INSE viewed increasing Chinese presence in south 
Asia as a loss, thereby making them more likely to formulate and endorse risky strategy 
to regain ground. Of the four naval strategy options that were being considered at the turn 
of the century, the blue water strategy emerged; it was the riskiest option because of the  
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high variance of outcomes that could result from its implementation as well as a low 
probability of success. Prospect Theory analysis provided more explanatory power in this 
case than the threat-response model.  
E. PROSPECT THEORY APPLICABILITY TO MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS 
Prospect Theory has already been utilized in the study of international relations to 
analyze top level decision making. What has been shown in this paper is the potential for 
Prospect Theory to be used to model military decision making processes. For example, 
events in military history such as Hitler’s decision to launch the campaign that would 
come to be known as the Battle of the Bulge during World War II or General 
MacArthur’s amphibious assault into Inchon during the Korean War are just two 
examples of many which Prospect Theory could provide critical insight into the 
mechanics of high level decision making. In the first instance Hitler endorsed a risky plan 
to break through the Allied front in France along a narrow sector and drive forces toward 
the Port of Calais, hoping to inflict a devastating loss on the Allies. In the second case, 
General MacArthur endorsed a risky amphibious assault behind North Korean lines in 
order to cripple a once rapidly advancing army. Prospect Theory may also have 
battlefield applicability. Knowledge of the principle insight of Prospect Theory, that if a 
decision maker is psychologically in the domain of losses he will subsequently be 
inclined to select the riskiest options from a set of options, will allow a Commander’s 
Intelligence staff to more confidently project an enemy’s most likely course of action. 
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